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ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the recent Version 10.7 Operational Flight Program (v10.7
OFP) Flight Control System upgrade to the F/A-18A-D (legacy) Hornet fighter aircraft.
This developmental program endeavored to improve high angle-of-attack (AOA)
maneuverability while vastly reducing the aircraft’s susceptibility to sustained out-ofcontrolled flight events.

Although the original F/A-18 Hornet, designated F/A-18A through F/A-18D, has
been acclaimed for its departure resistance as well as its exceptional maneuverability as a
fighter aircraft, the model, in actuality, has suffered from significant losses due to out-ofcontrolled flight (OCF) mishaps. Since its development in the early 1980s, eighteen
Hornets have been lost to a particular OCF mode called “Falling Leaf”, including eight
aircraft crashed since 1999.

With no improvements, 10 additional aircraft, at a cost of

$40 million each, were forecast to be lost.

Two-seat aircraft are lost at a higher rate per flight hour than the more common
single-seat version. Analysis of flight test data indicates that more two-seat aircraft
sustain Falling Leaf mode due to their increased departure susceptibility. Additionally, it
is apparent that the increased sprung mass of the control system, due to the addition of
the rear cockpit control stick, may delay or inhibit recovery from a sustained Falling Leaf
departure. This may be caused by uncommanded Flight Control System inputs from
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lateral control stick inertial motion induced by high sideforces encountered during a
Falling Leaf.

The v10.7 OFP test effort conducted a complete out-of-control flight test program
without the benefit of having an attached spin-recovery parachute during testing. The
specific test method and risk mitigation techniques used during this test program are
reviewed and documented in this thesis to provide a historical record for future testing.
By using the lessons learned from the development of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
testing conducted a few years earlier, the v10.7 Team was able to complete the test at a
large cost and schedule savings.

The author concludes that the test program is an exceptional success. The new
low airspeed and high AOA maneuvering capabilities inherent with the v10.7 software
revolutionize how pilot aircrew will fight the aircraft. Further, the extremely enhanced
resistance to sustained departure modes during out-of-controlled flight events will
substantially reduce the frequency of aircraft mishaps and the associated loss of training
and assets.
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PREFACE
“I CAN’T BELIEVE THIS IS HAPPENING….”
It’s 1998 and I’ve got less than 12 hours logged as hornet pilot. I’m airborne on
my first local “day trainer” flight in a two-seat F/A-18D. At that time, I had amassed
over 2000 total military flying hours, over 1000 of them mastering the quirky flying
qualities of the departure prone F-14 Tomcat with its antiquated analog flight control
computers (FCS). My previous total of four Hornet flights had all been administrative
cross countries.
It’s my second flight after reporting to my new test squadron after Test Pilot
School (TPS) and I’d like to “bend the jet around” a little and take a look at the aircraft’s
famed superior flying qualities and extreme high angle-of-attack (AOA) capability.
Although scheduled as a test-support flight to chase a Super Hornet during its test flight,
the other jet was not ready on time, so I went out as a single aircraft, with my new Hornet
Department boss in my back seat, on a good deal flight to help build my experience in the
jet.
My backseater this day was not a pilot but instead a Marine Corps Weapons
Systems Officer (WSO). He encouraged me to start right off with some rather extreme
maneuvering right after climbing to altitude in the assigned Test Range. However, I was
fresh out of TPS, so I elected to build up more gradually with some loops and rolls, then
some level (1g) high AOA maneuvers. Boy, everyone’s right—this jet’s a dream to fly
compared to the Tomcat. It seems like its on rails, almost magical in its capabilities.
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With half of my fuel used, my backseater convinces me to “turn up the heat a
little” and try something new. It was time to try an aggressive high AOA wingover-type
maneuver called a pirouette maneuver—starting at 18,000 feet, 300 knots, I aggressively
pull up, then start rolling left…down to 170 knots now at 22,500 feet, feeding in more
left rudder pedal and left and aft stick…nose is still a hair above the horizon but should
come down. I’m rolled left wing knife-edge down, but the nose has stopped as the jet
decelerates through 120 knots. Hmmm? Oops, AOA is way up at 40 degrees, better add
a hair of forward stick to reduce the AOA. Although I’ve got left stick and rudder inputs
commanded, the jet stops responding and in fact starts a slight right roll. Darn, I’ve
departed—I recite the NATOPS Procedures: CONTROLS—RELEASE, FEET OFF
RUDDERS, Speed brake in, Throttles IDLE… My backseater is laughing at me.
I’m at 22, 800 feet, out-of-control on a beautiful CAVU summer day over the
Chesapeake Bay. I’m waiting for the nose to come down, lawn-dart fashion, just like all
the other jets I’ve flown. Still waiting. Finally, the nose is 40 degrees below the horizon,
but there’s considerable side force (lateral g) building, pushing me forcefully to the right
side of the cockpit. Time stands still. I hear the wind roaring sideways over the top of
the cockpit canopy and windscreen. The yaw rate warning tone is screaming at me.
Then, the nose comes back up, way up (it’s going the wrong way!). I notice the control
stick deflecting laterally. At first I think somehow I must have inadvertently bumped it
as I was flung sideways, but then realize that it’s actually moving in response to the same
lateral g-forces pushing me around. I try to re-center the stick by hand but its weight
under g, as well as the awkward sideways g-forces, prevents me from holding it
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stationary or being sure where the neutral position really is. As I briefly attempt to hold it
neutral, I instantly understand why NATOPS says to just let go and not touch the controls
so I let go again—one can’t hold the lightly sprung controls stationary while subjected to
these violent forces. More violent sideforces the other way, warning audio tones
signaling that yaw rate is building, and disturbingly loud wind-like buffeting noise over
the canopy and windshield. I’m grabbing the towelbar-like handles on the metal canopy
bow for leverage to avoid having my head smash into the Plexiglas canopy. The laughter
that I heard from my boss earlier in the backseat has stopped. We’re falling through
17,000 feet. I think of reaching for the stick to shove it full forward per the falling leaf
recovery procedure, but the NATOPS Manual warned of trying that procedure too early,
and I don’t think that the steady periodic characteristic of the falling leaf mode is quite
established. Additionally, I’ve already seen a moment earlier holding the stick still
would be tough to do. I wish my lapbelt was tighter.
Finally after a couple more oscillations, the nose comes down and stays down, the
sideforces subside, and I’ve happily got a face-full of mother-earth to look at. I pull out
from the dive, bottoming out at 8,000 feet over the Bay. I had lost about 14,000 feet
during this OCF incident. I’ve had enough fun for the day and immediately return to
base and land. I look over the jet carefully after I get out and verify it’s none the worse
for wear, as I contemplate the “Jeckle and Hyde” Hornet—effortless to fly 99.9% of the
time, but able to truly “uncork” if grossly mishandled.
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My new boss, an experienced WSO with over 2000 hours in the Hornet later tells
me that although I had a good departure, he had seen and been through a worse one
before.
Clearly, I realize the Hornet needs a fix to make this OCF characteristic go away.

DISCLAIMER
A portion of the information contained within this thesis was obtained through the
author’s participation in a United States Department of Defense sponsored program in
conjunction with the Naval Air Warfare Center, Aircraft Division. The research, results
and discussion, and conclusions presented are the opinion solely of the author and should
not be construed as an official position of the Naval Air Systems Command, the United
States Navy, nor the United States Department of Defense.
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CHAPTER I. PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS

INTRODUCTION
The departure characteristics of the F/A-18A-D Hornet received the personal
attention of the author early on. Within the first month of flying the aircraft, the author
experienced a rather disconcerting out-of-controlled flight (OCF) event. That event is
described in detail in the Preface to this paper.
The purpose of this thesis is to: (a) detail the history of the legacy Hornet and the
Falling Leaf character it exhibits, (b) discuss the methodology that was used to both
suppress the Falling Leaf OCF characteristic and improve the high angle of attack (AOA)
maneuvering capability of the aircraft, using technology that matured with the F/A-18E/F
Super Hornet development program, (c) provide an historical record of the test
methodology and risk mitigation techniques utilized by the test team to plan and conduct
a high risk OCF flight test while achieving a moderately low cost goal, (d) discuss the
results of the test program, and finally (e) draw conclusions based on those results.

LIMITATIONS TO SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
The scope of this thesis is limited to only the characteristics of the flight control
software modifications that occurred during actual flight test. Only results that directly
affect departure resistance, high AOA maneuverability, and Falling Leaf suppression are
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presented. The management of this developmental program, outside the realm of actual
flight test, is not discussed. Simulation and software development techniques are also
outside the scope of this thesis.
Furthermore, this thesis does not discuss the other aircraft issues that the new
software was designed to improve. Those issues included F/A-18 flight control system
redundancy management, Automatic Carrier Landing System (ACLS) improvement, and
Datalink degraded modes.
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CHAPTER II. BACKGROUND OF THE HORNET AND OUT-OFCONTROLLED FLIGHT

DESCRIPTION OF F/A-18A-D
The F/A-18 Hornet first flew on November 18, 1978. A three-view of the single
seat variant is depicted below as figure 1. The two-seat versions (F/A-18B and F/A-18D)
are similar, however their cockpit canopies are longer due to the configuration of the
seats.

Figure 1. Three-View of F/A-18 Aircraft.
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The F/A-18 airplane is a high performance, twin engine, supersonic fighter and
attack airplane manufactured by McDonnell Douglas Corporation (now Boeing, St.
Louis). The F/A-18A and F/A-18C are single seat aircraft while the B/D are tandem twoseat versions. The aircraft features mid-mounted, variable-camber wings with moderate
sweep, twin vertical stabilizers canted out 20° from the vertical, and leading edge
extensions (LEXs) along each side of the forward fuselage from the wing roots to just
forward of the windshield. Basic aircraft weight is approximately 25,000 lb and
maximum takeoff weight is 51,900 lb. Maximum internal fuel load is approximately
10,200 pounds with the option of adding up to an additional 6,600 pounds of fuel in three
(2,200 lb/tank) externally mounted fuel tanks. The remainder of the gross weight capacity
allows for carriage of external stores and pod mounted sensors. The airplane is
configured with full span leading edge flaps, inboard trailing edge flaps, and outboard
ailerons on each wing. The flight control system consists of two digital flight control
computers with 701E processors that utilize a full authority control augmentation system
to operate the hydraulically driven control surfaces. The aircraft is equipped with twin
General Electric F404-GE-400 low-bypass turbofan engines with afterburners, which are
designed to produce 10,700 lb thrust at MIL and 16,000 lb thrust at MAX at sea level
conditions. Newer aircraft are equipped with F404-GE-402 Enhanced Performance
Engines (EPE) with slightly higher thrust ratings. Flight controls are hydraulically
actuated and computer-driven according to pilot control inputs and flight conditions.
Pilot interface for the flight control system is through a conventional center mounted
control stick, rudder pedals, and dual engine throttles on the left console. Spring
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cartridges in all modes are designed to provide the pilot control stick and rudder feel.
The aircraft is designed to carry a variety of air-to-air (A/A) and air-to-ground (A/G)
weapons, as well as up to three 330 gallon external fuel tanks (EFTs). The Hornet is
equipped with systems designed to enable successful engagement of surface and airborne
targets, and rapid switching between A/A and A/G modes. Avionics (software) system
interface is through an up-front-control (UFC), three multi-function display (MFD) units
in each cockpit, and a head-up display (HUD) for the forward cockpit. Additionally,
extensive system control is accessible to the aircrew with controls located on the throttle
and control stick through the hands-on-throttle-and-stick (HOTAS) system.

HORNET FLYING QUALITIES
Although very early on in the developmental program, the Hornet’s overall flying
qualities could be described as rather poor, that deficiency was rapidly remedied with
minor structural changes and modification to its flight control system (FCS) software
(Sweetman, 1987). Since that time, each successive version of the FCS software load,
referred to as an Operational Flight Program (OFP), has either further enhanced the
actual flying qualities of the aircraft or provided the pilot with better FCS displays or
failure detection modes. The several revisions of the FCS software are listed in figure 2.
OFP Version 10.5.1, first introduced in 1996, has provided exceptional flying
qualities and superior maneuverability for both U. S. Navy pilots as well as several
foreign military services.

The Hornet’s key design features, including leading edge
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Figure 2. F/A-18A-D Flight Control Computer (FCC) Operational Flight Program (OFP)
Developmental History from 1980 through 2004 (DeMond, 2003).
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extensions forward of the wing and fully fly-by-wire advanced digital flight controls,
truly enhanced its extreme low speed handling capabilities. To fight other aircraft,
Hornet pilots were taught to exploit the Hornet’s superior high angle of attack (AOA)
maneuverability to ensure their best chance for victory in an air-to-air dogfight.
Maneuvering the Hornet safely at slow speed however required special precautions and
was not without risk. That is because the Hornet exhibits an unfortunate “cliff” in its
handling characteristics. The exceptional flying qualities the F/A-18 exhibits from the
well integrated Control Augmentation System (CAS) tends to lull the unwary pilot into
attempting ill-advised maneuvers impossible to complete. The easily identified pilot
feedback that typically accompanies flight near the aerodynamic limit in most aircraft
(such as wind noise, buffet, or degraded flying qualities) is much more subtle in a Hornet.
Therefore, the one glaring exception to the Hornet’s brilliant reputation has been a
continued susceptibility to an out-of-controlled (OCF) flight regime known as the
“Falling Leaf” mode.
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CHAPTER III. HISTORY OF THE FALLING LEAF MODE AND
PROPOSED REMEDIES

EARLY TESTING
The first F/A-18 lost at sea was due to an Out-of-Controlled flight incident during
Basic Fighter Maneuvering (BFM) testing. This incident occurred on 14 November 1980
at Patuxent River Naval Air Station, during the developmental testing of the Hornet.
Since that time, 19 additional aircraft, and several pilot lives have been lost due to
crashes caused by OCF.
There are two primary sustained departure modes of the Hornet—a spin mode and
a Falling Leaf mode. The aircraft FCS is equipped with a Spin Recovery Mode (SRM)
that includes flashing command arrows on the cockpit displays and simple pilot
procedure to input lateral stick in the direction of the command arrow. However, the
Hornet has rarely been found to spin operationally and the SRM has not assisted in many
recoveries. Unfortunately, the Spin Recovery Mode has a tendency to falsely activate in
a Falling Leaf departure. Of the twenty aircraft lost due to OCF, eighteen of the mishaps
were attributed to the Falling Leaf sustained departure mode (Heller, 2003). In addition
to this, numerous formal Hazard Report Messages detailing Falling Leaf departure nearmishaps have been submitted to the Naval Safety Center (Bates, 2004).
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DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE FALLING LEAF MODE
The Falling Leaf motion can best be characterized as in-phase roll and yaw
oscillation with basic characteristics similar to the well known Dutch roll mode. The
Falling Leafmode has a 4-6 second period and is sustained with little or no damping. The
motion is bounded by steeply banked rolls, large AOA and sideslip excursions, and with
large sideforce peaks. AOA typically varies from –10 to 70°; Angle of Bank (AOB) can
achieve +/-100°; and peak yaw rates may exceed 60°/sec with heading changes of up to
45°. This periodic motion generates 1-1 ½ g’s of sideforce in the cockpit along with
periods of near zero normal g causing a “light in the seat” sensation. This motion
typically is sustained for significant time, resulting generally in altitude losses of 12,000
feet, but occasionally as much as 24,000 feet (Heller, 2003). An additional issue is that
the falling leaf yaw rates generated were sufficiently strong to activate cycling spin
recovery command arrows on the cockpit displays. This problem was addressed in 1984
by FCC OFP v10.1, designed to reduce the occurrence of false command arrows during
Falling Leaf departures but the hazardous false spin arrow indications were not
eliminated. According to several hazard reports and mishap reports, pilots have
improperly “chased” the false spin arrows with lateral stick inputs and inadvertently
aggravated, delayed, or prevented recovery (Potter, 2001).
Figure 3 depicts a time history of a typical Falling Leaf type departure captured
during flight test on 7 April 2000. Pitch rates are lower in magnitude (up to 30°/sec) than
the depicted roll and yaw rates, with peak pitch rates leading the roll/yaw peak rates by
9
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Figure 3. F/A-18B Falling Leaf Motion (Typical) (7 April 2000 flight).

about 90° phase difference. The horizontal axis is time in secs from an arbitrary initial
value.

TWO SEAT VERSUS SINGLE SEAT FALLING LEAF SUSCEPTIBILITY
Of the 20 OCF mishaps in the history of the Hornet, 7 have been in two-seat F/A18Ds. The remainder have been in single-seat F/A-18A or C aircraft. Although Potter
concluded that there “appeared to be no difference between the various models in causing
OOCF mishaps and this data suggested that OOCF accidents could occur in any F/A-18
model” (Potter, 2001), this is not necessarily the case if one looks at a OCF departure rate
per 100,000 flight hours. Data obtained from the Naval Safety Center indicates that in
Fiscal Year 2003, single-seat Hornets had 7 reported OCF events during 192,632 flight
hours for a rate of 3.63. In the same time period, two-seat Hornets had 4 events in just
62,561 hours for a rate of 6.39 (Bates, 2004). Two aircraft were lost in crashes during
Fiscal Year 2003, one single-seat C and one two-seat D. Therefore based on this data,
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two-seat aircraft have almost twice the likelihood of encountering an OCF departure and
over 3 times the likelihood of crashing due to the occurrence than single-seat Hornets.

POSSIBLE PROBLEMS WITH THE TWO-CONTROL STICK MODIFICATION
As was observed by the author and noted in the Preface, the control stick tends to
displace laterally due to the strong oscillatory sideforces present during post stall
gyrations and the Falling Leaf departure. A time history of the hands free control stick
position during the same Falling Leaf test event presented in figure 3 above, is provided
in figure 4. Other recorded test data from two control stick configured aircraft revealed
lateral stick motion of at least this magnitude and often times more than ¾ inch
deflection, dependent apparently on the mechanicalical characteristics of each individual
aircraft’s flight control system.

Stick Pos (1/100 in)
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75
50
25
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-25
-50
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Figure 4. F/A-18B/D Uncommanded Control Stick Motion Data During Falling Leaf
Departure (7 April 2000 Flight).
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During a recent informal test by the author, a single seat F/A-18C control stick
was found to be well damped, with one slight overshoot when released from an initial 2
inch lateral displacement. The stick exhibited similar damping characteristic in either left
or right directions. However, a two-seat jet configured with two control sticks was found
to exhibit three overshoots from similar initial displacements, with a damping ratio of
about 0.4. This difference in mechanical characteristics of the flight control sticks in the
two-seat aircraft becomes quite perceptible if the pilot observes carefully. This
characteristic is due to the increased sprung mass of the 2-stick trainer-configured aircraft
(Mitchell, 2003).
In flight test of two-stick equipped F/A-18B/D, uncommanded lateral stick
displacements of up to 0.79 inches were observed during falling leaf motion (Flight Test
Data, 5 April 2000). This is critical for two separate reasons. The first is that this control
stick movement is providing undesirable and uncommanded inputs to the FCCs. The
second issue is that in OFP 10.5.1, the Automatic Spin Recovery Mode (ASRM) is
activated when the pilot—or inertial forces—slightly displaces the control stick laterally
in the direction of the commanded spin recovery arrow greater than 0.3 inches. As
uncommanded inertial stick movement may exceed 0.3 inch, the FCC improperly enters
the spin recovery mode. As the aircraft is not in actuality in a spin regime, this
characteristic delays recovery.
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HUMAN FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH OCF
An out of control event has several very significant human factors issues lining up
against the pilot. Most obviously, out-of-control flight is an unplanned event, at least in
all operational OCF cases.
A summary of the adverse human factors issues present during typical unplanned
OCF incidents are:
1.

Substantial aircrew stress when faced with an unfamiliar situation that

historically has not been adequately simulated during training.
2.

Aircrew must quickly recover from the surprise, even shock, that they

have seriously errored by departing the aircraft.
3.

The pilot anxiety level is typically rather high, fearful that ejection may be

necessary and loss of the aircraft may be eminent.
4.

Disorientation from analytical or cognitive saturation or overload may

occur due to the rapidity of changing flight parameters and display hysteresis, or sensor
latency (Wiener, 1988).
5.

Physical incapacitation due to dynamic load factors, including large side-

forces, during a Falling Leaf departure. It is difficult or impossible to maintain precise
control inputs in this dynamic environment. Unintentional stick or rudder pedal inputs
due to the violent aircraft motion environment are not uncommon unless the pilot is
secured tightly in the seat by his harness and the pilot grabs the handholds on the canopy
bow for leverage.
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These issues combine to result in diminished situational awareness (SA), as well
as the physiological phenomena of time dilation, reduced mental capacity, fixation, and
vestibulo-ocular disorientation (Zamka, et al, 1997). The problem is further exacerbated
because Falling Leaf recovery takes time—and altitude. This is due to the aircraft’s
insufficient nose-down pitch control power available for recovery compared to the strong
nose-up tendency caused by inertial pitch coupling (Potter, 1997). The NATOPS Flight
Manual actually specifies that “extraordinary patience” is required for recovery
(NATOPS, 2003). However, the mental trait of “extraordinary patience” is exceedingly
difficult to achieve during any prolonged departure.

HISTORY OF FALLING LEAF RECOVERY PROCEDURES
For nearly twenty years of operation, the prescribed upright Falling Leaf recovery
procedure in the Hornet was to place the control stick full forward while maintaining
neutral lateral stick input and no rudder input (NATOPS, Change I, 1997). The problem
with this procedure was two fold: it was difficult to accomplish physically and (based on
mishaps and near-mishaps) did not work very well. Interestingly, this “Forward Stick”
procedure was based only on simulation and was never flight tested during development
(Potter, 2001). Finally in 1999, this procedure was flight tested when contradictory
evidence suggested that full aft stick (instead of full forward stick) would provide for a
more effective recovery from a sustained positive AOA Falling Leaf departure.
The results and conclusion from this five-flight test program were twofold:
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1) “Within the scope of the test, releasing the controls provided ‘very
dependable’ departure recoveries.”
2) “Full forward Stick Inputs aggravated the initial departure and the rapid nose
down pitch to negative AOA caused subsequent re-departures. Additionally, this control
input produced motion that was disorienting to the pilots due to the negative g
conditions.” (Naval Message of Final Report, June 2000)
Based on the results of this test, NATOPS was revised to delete pilot flight
control inputs during OCF. Therefore, unless a sustained spin was confirmed, recovery
procedures for the pilot were to maintain controls released and (patiently) await recovery.
In addition to the new procedure, a special “Departure Demonstration” flight syllabus
was developed and implemented by NAWCAD to educate Fleet aviators on the Hornet
departure characteristics. In his 2001 Thesis, “Analysis of Programs and Procedures
Designed to Mitigate F/A-18 Mishaps Caused by Out of Control Flight”, Potter
concludes, “These programs and procedures are likely to substantially reduce the number
of aircraft lost to OOCF (out of control flight)” (Potter, 2001).
Unfortunately, Falling Leaf mishaps continued. In fact, 7 Falling Leaf mishaps
have occurred since 2000. Of possible significance, 3 of the 7 aircraft were two-seat
F/A-18Ds. Clearly, the conclusion of the 1999 recovery procedures testing, that
“releasing the controls provided very dependable departure recoveries” was overly
optimistic, if not down right incorrect. Additionally, the assertion that the Departure
Demonstration flight syllabus would substantially reduce the aircraft loss rate appears to
be unfounded.
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THE HISTORY OF F/A-18 PROPOSED FLIGHT CONTROL FIXES
One of the first reports that sought to improve the departure resistance of the
aircraft was released in 1990. This investigation was produced by McDonnell Douglas to
propose FCC changes in response to a Navy request to improve known Falling Leaf
departure issues with the F/A-18 B/ D aircraft. Those two-seat aircraft required
significant AOA limitations above 0.7 Mach number and still were more susceptible to
departure (NATOPS, prior to IC79). That 1990 report recommended adding sideslip and
sideslip rate feedback to FCC gains when responding to pilot roll commands. The report
was well received by the NAWCAD engineering community. However, there was
substantial resistance from F/A-18 aircrew. The pilots were concerned that increased
departure resistance would necessitate reduced high AOA maneuverability and roll
performance. NAVAIR interest in support for this program was finally withheld in 1993,
as funding was re-centered around the development of the Super Hornet Program
(Heller, 2003).

F/A-18E/F SOLUTION
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet appears to be, and was billed to be, geometrically
and aerodynamically similar to the original F/A-18A-D Hornet—often referred to as the
“legacy Hornet”. However, the E/F FCS was developed with significant funding that
allowed for several advances to the flight control system. Fred Madenwald, the senior
Boeing Test Pilot for the Super Hornet stated in 1997 that a primary goal during the
Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD) phase of the E/F Super hornet
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was to suppress the Falling Leaf mode that was prevalent on the original C/D Hornet
(Madenwald, 1997). The Super Hornet high AOA design ended up much more advanced
than what was proposed to cure the Hornet in 1990.
The airframe and FCC software design changes to the Super Hornet that were
incorporated to either directly or indirectly delete Falling Leaf departure characteristics
were:
1. Increased Nose-Down Stabilator Travel from 10° nose down to 20° nose
down.
2. Differential Stabilator (Diff-stab) was used as a primary yaw device instead of a
rolling device at elevated AOA (above 30°): This is because a significant amount of
adverse yaw is generated by differential deflection of stabilators at greater than 20º AOA.
The stabilator that is deflected trailing edge down (TED) creates very high induced drag
on that side, producing yaw opposite the commanded roll. The Legacy Hornet’s old
v10.5.1 FCC software used considerable rudder (up to full 30º deflection) to coordinate
even small lateral stick inputs due to this diff-stab induced adverse yaw. The old
software therefore drastically limited roll command gains (diff-stab + aileron) when the
rudders were saturated, resulting in sluggish roll performance when greater than 30°
AOA. However, the E/F was able to achieve greater roll performance (roll rates) at
elevated AOA by deflecting the differential stabilator opposite to the aileron. This
method causes significant yaw moment in the direction that assists the rudder and
prevents adverse yaw.
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3. Sideslip rate feedback was fed back to the FCCs to control Dutch roll mode
above 20ºAOA. This signal is derived from pitch and roll angles from the aircraft
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and computed from a combination of lateral
acceleration and the integration of sideslip rate.
4. Add a software algorithm to the flight controls that serves to provide tailored
output for the limiting of simultaneous aircraft roll and pitch rates. This was
accomplished by supplying added logic that automatically reduces the aircraft’s actual
roll rate when both pitch and roll rates are too high to avoid cross coupling departure
regions. This effectively reduces the gain of lateral stick inputs when combined with
large or abrupt aft stick longitudinal pilot inputs. The functionality of this limiter is that
it gives the pilot the pitch rate or AOA that is commanded with longitudinal stick but at
the expense of commanded roll rate to prevent aircraft departure.

DESCRIPTION OF THE LEGACY HORNET FCC OFP UPGRADE SOFTWARE
The upgraded F/A-18A-D FCC software version that was developed as a result of
this test program is OFP v10.7. It was developed in large part by the lessons learned and
the techniques developed on the Super Hornet F/A-18E/F program. Much of the
upgraded legacy Hornet FCC architecture was taken directly from that developed for the
Super Hornet. This extensive technology transfer scheme is depicted graphically by the
timeline in Figure 5.
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FCC v10.7 Built Upon F/A-18E/F Lessons Learned
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Figure 5. Flight Control Technology Transfer Timeline between F/A-18A-D and F/A18E/F (Wallace, 2003).

The FCC software actually used for the majority of the developmental test flight
program was designated OFP v10.6.1. This software load was a flight worthy version of
the software used for ground functional and structural mode interaction (SMI) testing
(v10.6). The software load was based on existing legacy Hornet v10.5.1 OFP software
integrated with Super Hornet derived changes that were designed to improve redundancy
management, increase departure resistance, and improve recovery characteristics from
out-of-control flight. Major changes to the OFP included E/F FCS features 2 through 4
as discussed in the preceding paragraphs.
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OFP 10.6.1 FEATURES
The following features were incorporated in v10.6.1 (Heller, 2003):
1. Sideslip Rate Feedback: An accurate estimator of sideslip rate (β dot) can be
calculated from true airspeed, g, Ny (lateral g), pitch and roll angles and rates, and AOA.
2. Sideslip Feedback: With the production F/A-18A-D lacking a sideslip probe,
sideslip (β) is calculated by simply integrating the β dot estimate discussed above.
3. AOA Estimator >35° AOA: This estimator presented the highest technical
risk of the program because it was not previously developed and tested during E/F Super
Hornet development. The E/F AOA probes are accurate to 50°AOA by design while the
F/A-18A-D probes are only valid to 35°. During Falling Leaf departures, AOA is
typically 60-70°, well outside the capabilities of either A-D or E/F AOA probes.
Accurate AOA input was essential to the calculation of sideslip rate, and successful
suppression of the Falling Leaf was key to program success.
The concept of using data form the Inertial Navigation System (INS) to compute
AOA was considered. However, that would have required a software change to the
aircraft Mission Computers (MCs) that would have increased the cost and complexity of
this program immensely.
Instead, the AOA estimator uses integration of a computed AOA rate signal. The
AOA estimator uses actual stabilator position as the driver and uses a “look up table”.
This method was based on AOA estimation techniques that was developed and is used on
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the F-15 fighter. This information required for this AOA estimation already completely
resided within the FCCs and did not require expensive modification to the MC software.
Although the F/A-18 is statically unstable in most flight regimes with typical fuel and
ordnance loads, the aircraft is longitudinally stable at all AOAs above 35º. The FCS
control law uses measured AOA below 31º AOA. When probe AOA reaches 31º, AOA
selection logic starts to use a blend of probe AOA and the output of the AOA estimator.
By 33º, the output of the AOA estimator is used as the sole AOA source for the lateral
and directional axes.
4. Air Data Estimator for AOA>30°: At high AOA, dynamic pressure as
measured by the Pitot tube is inaccurate. The estimation is a function of aircraft gross
weight, Nz, and Cz (normal force).
5. Rudder Pedal Gain Change with Airspeed and AOA: The Hornet is
susceptible to departure at low airspeed near zero AOA. Therefore rudder gain
reductions were tailored in that flight regime.
6. Pitch and Roll Inertial Coupling Limiters: A means of the FCS to respond
to aggravating simultaneous roll and pitch commands designed to provide improved
forgiveness for multi-axis control inputs. Previous OFP v10.5.1 caused severe departures
with abrupt full application of aft corner stick inputs. V10.6.1 design initially limits roll
rate during high pitch rate maneuvers in effort to prevent departures.
7. Spin Recovery Arrow Improvements: Design reduces the commanded antispin aileron at the termination of a spin as the recovery occurs. This is designed to
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prevent re-departures in the opposite direction (“progressive spin”) if the anti-spin
control input is held to long.
8. Pirouette Enhancer: The legacy Hornet pilots have developed a dogfight
maneuver that capitalizes on the aircraft’s ability to generate controllable sideslip rates to
rapidly reposition from nose-high to nose-low attitude. With the addition of β and βdot
feedback, this maneuver would not work unless there was provision left for it. This
“Pirouette logic” function is a means to boost the high AOA roll performance when
lateral stick and pedal are fully deflected in the same direction. The software feature is
designed to provide maximum controllable proverse sideslip commands in cases where
rapid gross roll acquisition is desired by the pilot. The “Pirouette logic” essentially
allowed commanded yaw rates approaching 40°/sec at elevated AOA and moderately low
airspeeds (less than approximately 250 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS)). The exact
functionality and software gains would be adjusted to maximize performance during the
testing.
The following is a summary of the high AOA related software changes
incorporated into v10.6.1:

•

Improve AOA maneuvering control Laws (High AOA Update)

•

High Angle of Attack Air Data Estimation

•

Angle of Attack Estimation > 35 deg

•

Spin Logic Update to Eliminate Erroneous Spin Arrows
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•

Angle of Attack Failure Detection and Selection Logic Revisions

•

High AOA Crossfeed Path Structural Filtering

•

DAF Options to revise FCS gain settings during testing if required

In the event that deficiencies were found in the updated v10.6.1 control laws,
alternate gains were built into the software that could be enabled real-time using a built in
software feature called “Dial-A-Function (DAF)" that was previously engineered into the
software.
For completeness, additional v10.6.1 software changes that were designed to
enhance FCS functionality, but not related to high AOA maneuverability and departure
resistance are delineated below:
•

MECH Reversion PBIT.

•

PBIT GO Overriding IBIT Degrade.

•

False Switching Valve BLIN and MSP Codes during Engine Shutdown.

•

Eliminate Nuisance IBIT Failures when Atmospheric Pressure is Too High.

•

Eliminate FCS Caution with MC1 Off.

•

ASM LEF Stall Monitor.

•

FLAP SCHED Caution not set for Right Leading Edge Flap in Hinge Moment.

•

LEF Hydraulic Motor Fail Detect Logic Modifications.

•

Throttle Backdrive Monitor Correction for Fast Reengagement.

•

Flight Test Message Definition for F/A-18 A-D FCC OFP V10.6.

•

Aileron / Rudder ASM Updates.
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•

TEF Asymmetry and Three Fail PBIT BLIN Codes.

•

ACLS Changes to Increase Protection from Upstream Failures.

•

Pitch Trim Initialization for PA Autopilot Disengage.

•

Rudder Toe-In Rate Limiter Improvements.

•

PBIT GO Overriding IBIT Degrade – MSP Code Changes.

•

Updated Flight Test Message Definition for High AOA Estimation Update.
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CHAPTER IV. FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURES USED TO SAFELY
CONDUCT OCF AND HIGH AOA TESTING USING
DEVELOPMENTAL FCC SOFTWARE

OVERVIEW OF TESTING
A total of sixty-eight test flights were flown by Test and Evaluation Squadron
TWO-THREE (VX-23) during the development of the FCS upgrades. Testing was
initiated in May 2002 with the v10.6.1 developmental software load and the final v10.7
tests were completed in April 2003. All developmental flights were conducted in the
local Patuxent River in-shore restricted areas (Restricted Areas 4006 and R4008) during
daylight visual metrological conditions (VMC). Testing was conducted in five phases as
delineated in Table 1 below. Exclusive use airspace was used for all but Phase 1 flights.
Chase aircraft were used for all flights, except for the initial instrumentation checkflight.
In all cases, the chase aircraft was an F/A-18A-D Hornet flown by another
developmental test pilot from VX-23 test squadron. The chase aircraft were used as a
target for operational test points during Phase 4. In some instances, the target/chase
aircraft were also equipped with FCCs loaded with v10.6.1. However, if the target/chase
aircraft was equipped with v10.6.1, real-time telemetry from that aircraft was monitored
by the test team as well. All test flights were flown by military aircrew assigned to VX23 with the exception of two Contractor-supplied test pilots. Both of the Contractor
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Table 1.
Planned Test Flights for FCC v10.6.1 and v10.7.
Test
Phase

Maneuvers
Descriptions
Load-outs (3):

0

Instrumentation
Checkflight

1

1 g Stalls,
WDTs, and 360
deg Rolls
OCF Recovery

2
3

3
4
5

Two-Place Aircraft Flights
FE

FE
w/Aft
CG

FCL

INT

FE + 2
Tanks

6K ft
lbs
Asym

12K ft
lbs
Asym

FCLP

1
3

3

1

3

1 g Stalls,
WDTs, and 720
deg Rolls, and
Multi-Axis
Inputs
INS- OFF/
Degraded Modes
Evaluation
Operational
Maneuvers
OFP v10.7 Final
Regression
Testing(2)

Single
Place
Flights

1

3
1

7

2

1

6

2

1

2
2(1)

2

3

6

2

2

1

1

2

3

Flight Totals: 7

7

22

4

2

8

4

11

Notes: (1) Operational maneuver flights in the FCL loading included inboard wing pylons.
(2) v10.7 testing was accomplished on a separate Test Program than v10.6.1 but spot checked all
configurations and test points.
(3) FE = Fighter escort (Air-to-air (A/A) wingtip missiles only). No wing pylons.
FCL = FE plus Centerline External fuel tank (EFT).
INT = Interdiction Load (Air to ground (A/G) bombs plus, 2 x EFTs,& self-protection A/A
missiles.
FCLP = Field carrier landing practice configuration, Centerline EFT + wing pylons.
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pilots were employed by Boeing and were former military pilots with extensive Hornet
experience.
The test and evaluation was performed over several separate test programs:
ground functional and structural mode interaction tests, developmental flight tests, and
regression flight tests of the fleet release OFP. There were three separate versions of the
OFP. The first OFP, V10.6 was used for ground functional and Structural Mode
Interaction (SMI) testing only. The results of the SMI testing were used to tune software
structural filters for the second OFP version, v10.6.1, which was used for the
developmental flight tests. Problems discovered during developmental testing had
software fixes incorporated into the third OFP version, v10.7, which was the fifth test
phase which consisted of regression testing prior to being released to the fleet. Changes
from v10.6.1 to v10.7 included:

•

Inadvertent Spin Mode Engagement Due to Lateral Stick Movement.

•

INS Monitor Trips Due to Slow MUX Communication.

•

Re-Departures during Spin Recovery.

•

Inaccurate Estimated AOA with Stores.

•

Pedal Sensitive during Guns Tracking.

•

Departure during Roll with 6K ft-lbs Asymmetry.
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•

Additional MUX Variables - HIAOA Advisory & Incident Data.

TEST SPECIFIC AIRCRAFT MODIFICATIONS
General Modifications to the Aircraft
It was ultimately decided that the primary aircraft for this testing would be an
F/A-18D model. This was due to the increased departure susceptibility of the two-place
canopy configuration. The aircraft (Bureau Number 163434, known as Salty Dog 120)
was equipped with a Digital Data Acquisition System (DDAS) instrumentation system.
For this test program SD 120 was modified with several rather low cost systems for this
test. These included an Over-the-Shoulder (OTS) video system, yaw rate and AOA
gauges on the glare-shield, and a fuselage chin mounted sideslip vane. The location of the
AOA and yaw rate gauges on the top of the glareshield is depicted in figure 6. The AOA
gauge used a blend of AOA probe and INS derived AOA, which are the same sources of
information as displayed on the HUD. The yaw rate gauge displayed INS yaw rate. The
yaw rate gauge was fixed to the right side and the AOA gauge was on the left. Finally, a
modification was completed to provide isolated signals from the flight control system to
the instrumentation system for precise flight control surface position data.
Additionally, a pilot chest restraint strap was installed on the ejection seat in the
forward cockpit of the test aircraft. This strap was designed to provide the pilot with
additional restraint during high yaw rate or other violent maneuvers, and did not
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Figure 6. Front Cockpit AOA and Yaw Rate Gauge Locations.

adversely affect the pilot’s performance of cockpit duties nor ejection seat operation or
procedures.
To compliment testing in SD120, a single seat aircraft was also used to verify the
single place canopy configuration compatibility with the new FCC software. Both
aircraft used for this test program were equipped with a yaw string attached on the
centerline of the forward fuselage, forward of the windscreen and within view of the
pilot.
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Additionally, the Amplifier-Control-Intercommunications (ACI) panel was
modified to provide the aircrew with control of FCC generated AOA/Yaw Rate tone
volume. This feature allowed these normally very loud warning tones to be attenuated
sufficiently to allow continuous and uninterrupted communication between the pilot and
the test team and chase aircraft.
No Spin Chute Nor Other Typical Spin Test Risk Mitigators
Traditionally, high AOA and OCF developmental flight testing has required the
use of an additional spin recovery chute (SRC) mounted on the tail of the aircraft for
emergency recovery if normal recovery methods fail. A SRC was developed for the F/A18 during the early development of the aircraft. The SRC system developed by the Navy
was transferred to Edwards Air Force Base for NASA’s use on their highly modified
High α Research Vehicle (HARV) F/A-18. Photos of the SRC as installed on an F/A-18
are presented as Figure 7.
The VX-23 v10.7 Test Team considered the addition of either this original SRC
or modifying the newer SRC developed for the Super Hornet. However, the team was
concerned that SRC package weight and aerodynamic affects would interfere with test
results. Additionally, the increased cost associated with that addition was a strong
negative. After carefully application of the other risk mitigators added to the program the
test team elected to forego the SRC.
Interestingly, after the testing of the NASA High α aircraft, NASA concluded that
“operationally, the SRC consumed a great deal of time—time that could have been better
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Figure 7. Spin Recovery Chute (SRC) as Installed and Demonstrated on an F/A-18
(NASA Photos).

spent on research tasks had the SRC been removed form the aircraft” (Bowers, 1996).

Engine Damage Risk Mitigation
Although the track record of the GE F404 engine in the Hornet is very good at
extremely high AOA, the Team considered the use of an Emergency Power Backup
System (EPBS) to provide battery power sufficient for flight control surface hydraulic
power in the event of a dual engine flameout. This type of system was used in the F/A18E/F Development as well as NASA’s HARV.

31

Again, the team elected to use other available risk mitigation to manage the risk
of dual engine failure. To prevent or reduce compressor rub during out of control flight,
pitch, roll, and yaw rate limits were imposed during departures resulting from tailslides,
spin maneuvers, MSRM Falling Leaf, and aggravated input maneuvers. The rate limits
were pitch rate of ± 86°/sec, roll rate of ±200°/sec, and yaw rate ±115°/sec during
departures.
If any of these limits was exceeded, the test flight would have been aborted and
the aircraft would return to base (RTB) for engine borescope inspection. Post flight data
analysis by propulsion engineers and the results of the borescope would determine if any
additional engine inspections were required. Although the test engines were groomed for
this program, several self-recovering pop stalls were detected during spin maneuvers.

TEST ENVELOPE
Testing was performed within NATOPS limits except as authorized by the
NAVAIR flight clearance that was obtained prior to testing. Table 2 contains two-place
and loading specific AOA and center of gravity (CG) limits as authorized by this flight
clearance, along with the corresponding NATOPS limits.

FLIGHT CLEARANCE ISSUES
All Navy flight test programs that modify avionics software, especially FCS
related software, or any physical modification to the aircraft require specific Flight
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Table 2.
Angle of Attack Limits.
Aircraft Configuration
Fighter Escort
Fighter Escort with
Centerline Tank
Fighter Escort with
inboard wing tanks
Interdiction

Up to 8,000 ft-lb lateral
asymmetry
Up to 12,000 ft-lb lateral
asymmetry(1)
Two-place specific limits

Flight Clearance Limits
Unrestricted with center of
gravity (CG) 17 to 25.5%
MAC
Unrestricted with CG 17 to
24% MAC
-10 deg to 40 deg with CG 17
to 24.5 % MAC
Unrestricted with lateral or
pedal inputs to maintain bank
angle only, with CG 17% to
24% MAC,
otherwise –10 deg to 30 deg
Unrestricted

NATOPS Limits (NATOPS, 2003)
Unrestricted with CG 17 to 25%
MAC
Unrestricted with CG 17 to 23.5%
MAC
-6 deg to 35 deg with CG 17 to 24%
MAC
-6 deg to 20 deg with CG 17 to 27%
MAC

-6 deg to 25 deg

-6 deg to 20 deg

Unrestricted

-6 to 20 deg from 0.7 to 0.8 Mach
-6 to 15 deg from 0.8 to 0.9 Mach
-6 to 12 deg above 0.9 Mach

-6 deg to 20 deg

Note: (1) After the two place testing in loadings FCL and 6KASYM was completed, the remainder of the test points for
loading 12KASYM were defined, and an additional flight clearance was requested.
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Clearance. Also, Flight Clearance is required to deviate from an applicable NATOPS
Operators Manual. Therefore, a local NAVAIR Flight Clearance was obtained for the
flight test instrumentation, cockpit analog yaw rate and AOA indicators, sideslip chin
vane, pilot chest restraint, and the modified ACI panel.
Additionally, a NAVAIR Flight Clearance was obtained for the following items:
Flight with FCC V10.6.1 and V10.7 OFP loaded in the FCC's.
Clearance to perform testing within the AOA limits in table XX.
Also, clearance to perform the following maneuvers prohibited in the NATOPS
Operators Manual was obtained:
Intentional departures and zero airspeed tail slides.
Zero g for up to 15 seconds during tail slides and 100 knot vertical
recoveries.
Intentional selection of the spin recovery switch to the RCVY position in
controlled flight (below 250 KCAS).
Intentional maneuvers with yaw rates in excess of 25°/sec. The maximum
target yaw rate shall be 90°/sec.
Full or partial stick aileron rolls up to 720° bank angle change (to verify
Blue Angels Flight Demonstration Maneuvers.
In-flight engagement of DAF.
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Negative g for up to 30 seconds with throttles MIL power or less.
AOA unrestricted at or above 0.7 Mach number in the two place aircraft,
except for the above loading specific limits.
Specific limits included in the NAVAIR Flight clearance that applied during FCC
OFP developmental testing only included:
All high AOA/high yaw rate maneuvering or intentional departures shall
be conducted with less then 100 lb of fuel in each external fuel tank.
Minimum altitude for intentional departures is 30,000 ft above ground
level AGL (however, all testing was actually accomplished over water).
Additionally, the following alternate recovery inputs were authorized in case an
intentional departure failed to recover using normal recovery procedures:
• If OCF below 20,000 ft and 12,000 ft has been lost during the departure,
full aft stick may be applied.
• If OCF below 10,000 ft, MAX A/B may be selected.
• Pilot selection of MSRM if lateral stick with arrow in ASRM does not
recover from a spin.
• If aerodynamic controls are insufficient to effect recovery from a spin,
asymmetric thrust may be used.
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• If still out of control below 10,000 ft, the pilot may select FCS gain
override.
• If INS attitude angles errors are suspected, the attitude selector switch may
be set to STBY.
• Authorization to restart an engine for landing, which had been shut down
following an engine stall during a departure maneuver, provided that
transient temperature limits were not exceeded.
The product of sideslip and dynamic pressure shall be monitored real time for all
intentional departures and spins and shall not exceed +/- 5500 lb/ft2.
For all intentional departures and spins of aircraft configured with stores the root
mean square of roll and yaw rates shall be less than 220°/sec when carrying air-to-air
stores, and less than 150°/sec when carrying air-to-ground stores.

TEST LOADINGS
The aircraft was weighed and the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical locations of
the CG were determined. In general, testing was performed with fleet representative
center of gravity locations. Ten test points were performed in the fighter escort (FE)
loadout while in an aft CG condition. For the aft CG test points, the test aircraft was
ballasted so that the CG was at the NATOPS aft limit with 2,000 lb of internal fuel. In
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this condition, the CG was aft of the nominal CG location as fuel is used during the
flight, but remained just within NATOPS limits.

METHOD OF TESTS
Test Method and Procedures
Before any testing started with the upgraded OFP, a flight with V10.5.1 was
flown to checkout the flight test instrumentation, the FCS rigging, and the suitability of
the radome for maneuvers at HI AOA. Also, baseline data for HI AOA roll performance
was collected during the checkout flight.
Testing of the upgraded FCC OFP 10.6.1 was evaluated during four phases.
Departure resistance to single-axis inputs was evaluated during Phase 1 and no departures
were performed. OCF flight recovery characteristics were evaluated during Phase 2
while the aircraft inertial navigation system (INS) was operating normally and while it
was disabled. After the recovery characteristics were verified, departure resistance to
aggravated inputs was evaluated during Phase 3. Additionally during Phase 3, the effects
of AOA failures on flying qualities and departure resistance was evaluated. Flying
qualities during operational maneuvers were evaluated during Phase 4. Detailed test
method descriptions and a detailed description of the buildup process are presented in
appendix A.
Due to the risk of high angle of attack testing, manned and off-line simulation was
used extensively to mitigate the risk of the program. The off line sim was a PC based,
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Boeing developed, Modular Six-Degree-of-Freedom simulation. Off-line simulation was
used to generate predicted trajectories for each maneuver. The test team used these
predictions during test flights and compared them with actual results. High risk and high
workload test points (test Phases 1 though 3) were practiced in the Manned Flight
Simulator (MFS) facility at NAWCAD. Many hours of MFS testing was used during this
program. The MFS’s data link capability was used to provide real-time simulated flight
data to the test team (over 3 miles away) at ground control room, known as the RealTime Telemetry Processing Stations (RTPS). This functionality allowed the test team to
rehearse test missions using the same strip chart and graphical displays that were used
during flights.

OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
Flight Briefing
The Test Conductor (TC) and the test team that supported the test flights at RTPS
conducted a thorough flight brief approximately 2 hours prior to the start of the scheduled
takeoff time. Emphasis of the flight brief was on test procedures, expected performance,
emergency, and safety considerations. Applicable test team communications were
reviewed for both normal and emergency procedures for each flight. Flight test cards,
which detailed communications, flight profiles, test parameters, and the sequence of
events, were provided to the pilot and the rest of the test team the day prior to a flight.
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Test Profiles
Each test flight followed a similar administrative flight profile. After ground
checks (NATOPS, control sweeps, and Manual Spin Recovery Mode check), taxi
(including yaw rate gauge check) and takeoff was accomplished. After transiting to the
R4006/R4008 inshore restricted area, the Phasing maneuver, g-awareness maneuver, and
wind calibration in climb were accomplished prior to performing the test points.
Go/ No-Go Criteria
The following items were considered go/no-go:
•

Chase aircraft (except for the instrumentation checkflight) and Search and
Rescue (SAR) support.

•

Ground Tracking mount video coverage for Phase 2 test flights.

•

RTPS telemetry room operational.

•

Hot mike telemetry available at RTPS.

•

Good weather, clear of clouds, discernable horizon, and view of ground.

•

Cockpit Video Recording System operational.

In addition, the following items were considered go/no-go for the two seat
aircraft:
•

Chest restraint required during Phase 2.
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•

Glareshield yaw rate analog gauges for all flights during Phases 1, 2, 3,
and 5 flights.

•

ICS if the aft cockpit was occupied.

Lastly, any malfunction or situation that the aircrew determined as unsafe
constituted a No-Go situation. Any downing discrepancy as defined by NATOPS or local
Standard Operating Procedures (VX-23 SOP, 2003) constituted a No-Go situation.
Real-time Data Monitoring Plan
Specific real-time monitoring requirements were detailed in the test planning
documents and are listed in Appendix C. Additionally, to ensure that critical information
was provided to the test aircrew in a timely manner, critical test team members were
identified with specific real-monitor monitoring responsibilities. In general, the plan
directed that each critical test team member was responsible for identifying specific
“knock-it-off” (KIO) or emergency conditions, and provided information to the test
conductor, as required. The test conductor then relayed that information to the test pilot.
The only exception were “Knock-it-off” calls to prevent an impending departure. For this
case, the flying qualities engineers provided KIO calls directly to the pilot, limited to
either "Recover – Yaw rate” or “Recover – Sideslip”. All other information was
channeled through the test conductor. To ensure that the critical members of the test team
maintained familiarity with KIO and emergency procedures, each critical test team
member had an initial simulation qualification and was required to maintain currency.
For the initial simulation qualification, that member practiced all of the emergency
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procedures related to their role. Project aircrew, test conductors, and flying qualities
engineers either participated in a simulation session or a test flight within 14 calendar
days to maintain currency. Flight control and propulsion engineers either participated in a
simulation session or a test flight within 30 calendar days to maintain currency.
Alternate OCF Recovery Procedures
Looking at the numbers of aircraft lost to OCF over the years, it was apparent the
published NATOPS recovery procedures were not as effective as desired. As this test
was attempting to put the aircraft into situations that caused Falling Leaf departures in
v10.5.1 software, concern that v10.6.1 Falling Leaf suppression might be ineffective led
the team to plan and rehearse alternate recovery procedures. This would preclude having
the pilot simply release the controls (per the NATOPS departure procedures) and
passively wait all 35,000 ft as the jet fell to earth. Previous OCF testing in 2000 as well
as some Fleet mishap data suggested that other techniques had merit and were added as
authorized recovery procedures for this testing. These techniques included applying full
aft stick and selecting full afterburner, and are detailed in Appendix B.
Cost of the FCC Development Flight Testing
Table 3 contains a list of the estimated Navy costs for this test program. These
costs only relate to preparing and conducting the flight test program.
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Table 3.
Total Cost Breakdown for All FCC Developmental and Regression Testing
(from David, 2002 and David, 2003).
TASK

Project
management
Project support
Aircraft
Preparation
Real Time
Processing
Station
Ground
Tracking Mount
Photo-theodalyte
Aircraft Ground
Usage
Aircraft Flight
Usage
Total:

10.7 Regression
Cost

REMARKS

10.6.1
Development
Cost
$219,000

$182,000

$40,000
$113,000

$29,000
$32,000

$153,000

$48,000

$34,000

$10,000

Video coverage of OCF flights

$30,000

$16,000

$1,888.000

$603,000

$367,000
$2,844,000

$95,000
$1,015,000

Ground charges during aircraft
lay-up.
F/A-18 test aircraft and chase
flight hours
KC-130 Tanker hours

Aircraft instrumentation, test
support, and data tapes
Software development and realtime monitoring telemetry
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CHAPTER V. TEST RESULTS

FLIGHT TESTING RESULTS
Departure Resistance Testing
The combined v10.6.1 and 10.7 test program consisted of approximately 600
specific test points. These included 400 rolls, 48 spins, and 63 tailslides. Significantly,
more tailslides were done in this development program than were accomplished in the
entire three-year F/A-18E/F development program (Swanson, 2003).
During flight testing, the OFP v10.6.1/10.7 AOA estimator output was compared
to the presumably more accurate INS derived AOA. Test data verified the accuracy of
the estimation method with satisfactory results. Throughout this program, the Falling
Leaf mode was successfully suppressed. That result, in and of itself made the program a
tremendous success.
However, during initial testing of 10.6.1 (test phases 1 through 4), several
deficiencies were present. Examination of the flight data during post-departure gyrations
indicated that automatic spin recovery mode (ASRM) was inadvertently engaged if the
stick moved left or right due to initial forces while a ASRM command arrow was present.
The Test Team was surprised to observe lateral stick deflections greater than one inch
during violent post stall gyrations in the two seat aircraft. When ASRM was engaged by
this uncommanded lateral stick activity, all feedback to the FCS was removed. This
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included the very important sideslip and sideslip rate feedbacks. This served to negate
the effectiveness of this upgrade, and delay departure recovery.
An additional FCS deficiency not related to Falling Leaf type departures (but
OCF related) was that the aircraft would occasionally re-depart after a spin recovery.
The software pertaining to ASRM was modified to more quickly disarm the spin mode
when yaw rate stopped.
Lastly, several non-OCF related deficiencies were found in 10.6.1 and addressed
successfully in v10.7. Rudder inputs were found to be too sensitive at high AOA for
predictable guns tracking. Additionally, accurate INS information to the FCCs was
lagging due to slow updates on the aircraft’s Multiplex Bus (MUX Bus).
Based on the 10.6.1 test results phases 1 through 4, the following changes were
incorporated into v10.7:
a) The lateral stick deflection threshold for spin recovery mode engagement was
increased from approximately 0.3 to 0.75 inches. This change successfully
inhibited incorrectly engaging ASRM due to all but the highest inertial
lateral forces on the stick(s).
b) The INS monitor logic was changed to compensate for MUX bus
communication delays.
c) The spin recovery mode disengagement threshold was reduced to when yaw
rates were less than 17 deg/sec.
44

d) A nonlinear pedal gradient was added to reduce rudder pedal sensitivity
during tracking maneuvers at high AOA.
e) Sideslip and sideslip rate feedback gains were increased around 30° AOA at
speeds from 0.8 to 0.9 Mach number.
Creation of OFP v10.7 after the testing of v10.6.1 software was a preplanned part
of the software developmental process. This iterative software building process assured
that discovered deficiencies could be rectified quickly. All of the listed issues in v10.6.1
were addressed in v10.7. Subsequent regression testing followed. All noted OCF
departure related discrepancies were successfully resolved.

Roll Performance Results
The roll performance of the aircraft at elevated AOA was found to be
significantly improved over v10.5.1. This increase is presented graphically in Figure 8.
As an example from the figure, at 40° AOA, the old v10.5.1 aircraft had very little
roll capability at all. The aircraft felt sluggish and rather unpredictable in roll forcing the
pilot to reduce or limit AOA to maneuver. With v10.7 however, roll rates were
predictable and usable at 15-25°/sec. Pilot comments were very positive. The figure
further shows that roll rates of over 20°/sec are possible at very high AOA with v10.7 up
to essentially full longitudinal aft stick sustained AOAs of 50-55º. Lastly, the
effectiveness of the “Pirouette logic” is apparent, allowing the pilot to command
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Figure 8. F/A-18A-D Time to Roll 90 Deg at High AOA with FCC OFP 10.7 vs. OFP
10.5.1 (Adapted from Heller, 2003).

progressively higher lateral aircraft response with the addition of coordinated rudder
pedal. Although not unusual for most aircraft to exhibit (classically referred to as
dihedral affect), the functionality was not mechanized in v10.5.1 software.
Previously, the Hornet did not roll well at high AOA (> 30° AOA). Legacy
Hornet pilots had discovered that cross control inputs (e.g., lateral stick in opposite
direction of rudder input and desired roll direction) could increase roll performance
during maneuver at high AOA. Analysis indicated that these cross control inputs
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produced proverse sideslip, which combined with the natural tendency of the aircraft to
roll away from sideslip at high AOA, improved roll performance.
Although the Hornet has had a great reputation as a “pitch pointer” that could use
high AOA excursions to its benefit, v10.7 provides additional capability to effectively
command roll and yaw at extreme AOA where the “old Hornet” could only pitch. The
v10.7 FCS high AOA sideslip control law designers created provided the pilot direct
control over sideslip at elevated AOA, with the sum of coordinated rudder and lateral
stick as the controller. For this control law, full rudder pedal input is equal to 3 inches of
lateral stick. At high AOA, combined inputs (sum of lateral stick and rudder) less than 3
inches are pure roll commands. Any combined command that is greater than 3 inches
introduces a bias signal into the sideslip feedback path, creating what is essentially
commanded sideslip. This resulting sideslip produces an increase in roll rate via dihedral
effect.
During v10.7 evaluation flights by the author, the aircraft maneuverability with
v10.7 was truly eye-watering. The author found that “simple performance graphs do not
do the new maneuvering capability justice…the high AOA roll and yaw capabilities now
are so astounding that after the flights, one must be careful not to attempt to describe
them with your hands, or you risk breaking your wrist” (Mitchell, 2003).
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CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS
Adequacy of the AOA and Sideslip Estimators
Real time comparison of the AOA and sideslip estimators with truth data
computations derived from inertial data were displayed in the control room and
constantly monitored during testing. The comparisons were consistent and acceptable in
all flight conditions. From a performance standpoint, the measure of effectiveness of the
estimators was the successful suppression of Falling Leaf motion. Immediate damping of
residual oscillations after high AOA peaks during tailslide testing proved that the
estimators functioned satisfactorily.

Adequacy of the Risk Mitigation During the Test Program
The use of simulation to rehearse the flight benefited not only the test pilots, but
also the entire Test Team. The planned test sequence carefully selected by the team and
reviewed by the Test Coordination Team during the extensive test planning stages was
effective in overall risk mitigation.
The most significant surprise that occurred was the uncommanded lateral stick
movements encountered. In response to this, the test team ceased testing and “stooddown” for a week to review data and formulate a solution (David, 2004). This was an
excellent example of good risk mitigation in response to an unexpected result.
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Decision to Test Without a Spin Recovery Chute (SRC) nor Emergency Power
Backup System (EPBS)
After evaluating the risks associated with this testing, the v10.7 Test Team
deleted the requirement for traditional SRC and EPBS equipment. They utilized
Operational Risk Management (ORM) techniques and found ways to mitigate risk that
were effective. This resulted in a cost efficient, yet safe and successful flight test
program. Although a rather expensive test program, it should be noted that the nearly $4
million total cost estimate for this test program is approximately ten percent of the cost of
a single F/A-18C/D aircraft.
Departure Susceptibility and High AOA Maneuvering Capability of OFP v10.7
The 10.7 test team efficiently planned and executed a challenging test program
and provided the Navy with a revised F/A-18A-D FCS that enhances the maneuverability
and reduces departure susceptibility. Additionally, the v10.7 software is apparently very
effective at suppressing the dangerous sustained Falling Leaf mode after a departure
occurs. However, more time and Fleet operational flying with the new software is
required before that can be determined with certainty.
Based on the historical data regarding Hornet mishap rates, it is clear to the author
that if this initial test data is proved accurate and correct, this flight control enhancement
will function to save several expensive aircraft during the remainder of the Hornet
operational lifetime.

49

Future Training Program Still Required to Minimize OCF
Concern is justified that operational pilots may overestimate the capabilities of
the new FCS software. OPF 10.7 does not prevent departures nor make the aircraft
“bulletproof”. Pilot errors that cause OCF departures at low altitude will still lead to the
loss of the aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS
Recently, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld challenged the military to
reduce the military mishap rate by 50 percent in the next two years. “This software will
be a major benefit to the fleet and should greatly reduce the number of mishaps resulting
form out-of-control flight incidents,” said Admiral (Select) Jeff Wieringa, former Navy
F/A-18 Program Manager (Boeing News Release, June 2003). The danger is that pilots
will push the aircraft even harder or disregard training rules to win at any cost. The
potential for a substantial reduction in OCF related Hornet mishaps would only be
realized if training is effective and a proper safety culture in the Fleet is maintained.
Historically, 64% of all Naval aircraft mishaps were the result of “Skill Based Error”,
otherwise known as “Human Error” (Naval Safety Center, 2004). Therefore, an effective
Hornet OCF training program is an essential companion to the new FCC software.
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APPENDIX A: DETAILED METHOD OF TEST

GENERAL TEST APPROACH
The flight testing that was conducted during this program was sequenced and
prioritized to provide the safest and most efficient buildup to the different phases in an
attempt to most effectively accomplish the objectives. The majority of the testing was
focused on evaluating the updated controls at flight conditions where the modified
control laws are active. However, all phases of flight were spot checked as well. The
detailed method of test discussed in this appendix has been adapted from the VX-23 Test
Plans (David, 2002 and 2003) as well as lessons learned by the team during the test
program.
The approach was split into four phases during OFP v10.6.1 testing. Phase 1
consisted of controlled flying qualities maneuvers to verify aircraft flying qualities.
Those maneuvers consisted of 1 g stalls, wind-down-turns (WUTs), break turns, lateral
stick plus rudder pedal rolls, lateral stick only rolls, and rudder pedal only rolls. No
intentional departure maneuvers were planned for this phase. Phase 2 assessed and
confirmed the recovery characteristics of the aircraft from known high altitude OCF
situations such as tail-slides, spins and falling leafs using controlled buildup entries.
Confirming the OCF recovery characteristics from fully developed OCF modes during
Phase 2 provided buildup for the maneuvers that were conducted during Phase 3. Phase 3
maneuvers were either predicted to result in OCF or could unintentionally result in OCF.
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Phase 3 evaluated aircraft departure resistance with actual departure maneuvers, as well
as test departure resistance and recovery characteristics in the INS off mode and with
AOA failures. Phase 4 consisted of operational types of tactical maneuvers including
flat, rolling, and vertical scissors. Phase 5 was OFP v10.7 regression testing.

PLANNING FOR PROBLEMS
In the event the minor problems with the OFP were found during testing, Dial-afunction (DAF) options for minor changes to the control laws had been incorporated into
the OFP. If a deficiency was found during testing that a DAF option may correct, the
software gain change would be first evaluated in simulation, then a flight clearance for
the option would be requested and then that overall test plan would be amended.

TWO PLACE BUILDUP APPROACH
Testing in the single place aircraft in the FCL loading, and in the two place
aircraft in the FCL, 6KASYM, and 12KASYM loadings were required to clear the two
place placarded region. The Hornet aerodynamic simulation database, which is used to
generate predictions of expected results, is known to be inaccurate for the single place
clean aircraft at high angles of attack above 0.6 Mach number. Predictions for the two
place aircraft with a centerline tank were inaccurate as well, since these effects are
modeled with increments off of the single place clean aircraft. To evaluate the
aerodynamic database and to provide buildup for the two place aircraft in loading FCL,
lateral stick rolls were performed in the single place FCL loading during phase 1. This
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was the only testing performed in the single place aircraft with the wing pylons removed.
Since the aerodynamic effects of wing pylons are not well understood, removing the
pylons removed one unknown for evaluating the aerodynamic database. After the
accuracy of the database was evaluated against the single place aircraft and any updates
are incorporated, predictions were generated for the two place aircraft in the FCL
loading, and lateral stick rolls were performed during phase 3.
The envelope that was cleared for the two place aircraft with 12,000 ft-lb lateral
asymmetry loadings was based on the test results of the two place aircraft in loadings
FCL and 6KASYM, and the predictions for the 12KASYM loading. The current database
predicted violent departures and probable structure overloads for the two place aircraft in
the 12,000 ft-lb loading at 0.9 Mach number and 20° AOA. During a previous flight test
program, a two place aircraft with 11,200 ft-lb of lateral asymmetry departed during a
lateral stick roll at 20° AOA. After the lateral stick rolls in the two place aircraft were
performed in the FCL loading and the database was updated and predictions for the two
place aircraft in the 12KASYM loading were generated. The team then used those
predictions to determine how much of the envelope could be cleared and the team
submitted a test plan amendment with the finalized buildup approach for the 12KASYM
loading.
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STANDARD TEST PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES
The following procedures were performed in conjunction with each flight as
specified. Along with these procedures, a historical database of the preflight data values
obtained from the preflight listings was maintained.
Preflight Procedures
Preflight of the instrumentation was accomplished prior to each flying day by the
instrumentation personnel. Normal preflight activities included recorder checks, TM
checks, Instrumentation BIT, and preflight listings. The null measurements were taken
after the aircraft was set up to standard conditions, as defined in aircraft preflight
checklists, so that parameter preflight references were consistent from day to day.

Hangar Initialization Record
A 30 second hangar initialization record was recorded using the on-board
instrumentation data tape during preflight procedures. These were performed in the
hangar with the engines off, no airflow in the ECS or the engine bleed ducts, and with no
avionics cooling supplied. This information was used for instrumentation initialization
and validation for each flight.
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Control Cycles
Full throw cycling of the flight controls were performed and recorded on the onboard
instrumentation data tape as part of the pre-taxi procedures. These operations were used for
telemetry parameter verification and post-flight instrumentation/data measurand validation.
If half stick or half pedal maneuvers were planned for the flight, the pilot also practiced half
stick inputs with the Test Conductor critiquing each input.

MSRM Ground Check
Ground check of the manual spin recovery system was accomplished by the pilot
with engines running on flights that planned to use MSRM. The pilot selected MSRM and
checked that leading edge flaps drove to 34º, trailing edge flaps drove to 0º, and the spin
mode display appears on the DDI.

Cockpit Analog Yaw Rate Gauge Taxi Check
The cockpit analog yaw rate gauge was operationally checked with a hard turn
during taxi prior to flight. The turn verified that the direction and magnitude of yaw rate
indicated was correct.

59

Phasing Maneuver
A phasing maneuver was performed and recorded on the onboard data tape shortly
after takeoff and prior to beginning in-flight tests. This phasing maneuver served as a final
check of the ground station and onboard data system polarities. The maneuver consists of
the following consecutive control inputs:
Partial left stick input to achieve approximately 30 deg left wing down.
Partial right stick input to achieve approximately 30 deg right wing down.
Partial left rudder (aircraft nose left).
Partial right rudder (aircraft nose right).
Left and right throttle bodes
Aft stick (2g pull up).
Forward stick (-1.0 g push over).

G Awareness Maneuver
A g awareness maneuver was performed prior to beginning test maneuvers on flights
that required load factors in excess of 4 g’s. The maneuver was performed above 10,000 ft
above ground level (AGL) and consisted of a 4 g turn for 90 degrees of heading change,
followed by 6 g’s for another 90 degrees of heading change.

SPECIAL SAFETY PROCEDURES
Due to the unique nature of departure resistance and departure recovery testing,
special safety procedures and considerations were followed, including:
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1. All of the intentional departures were performed in the two place aircraft
to clear intentional departures in the single place aircraft. The two place
aircraft was equipped with a pilot chest restraint and cockpit analog
gauges for AOA and yaw rate. The chest restraint was used when
intentional departures are planned. Tailslides were only performed in the
single place aircraft after the two place aircraft previously cleared them.

2. When available, project pilots occupied the aft cockpit of the two seat
aircraft during Phases 1, 2, and 3 for currency and test continuity.

3. Entry and knock-it-off (KIO) criteria for test points were briefed before
each flight. KIO communication procedures will be practiced during
every pre-flight brief. Both NATOPS and the alternate recovery
procedures listed in appendix B were briefed prior to each flight.

4. All high risk or high workload test maneuvers were practiced in the
Manned Flight Simulator (MFS) prior to being performed in-flight.
Emergency procedures that were developed using the manned simulator
were practiced and refined on a periodic basis, to remain familiar and
proficient with anticipated aircraft response and normal and emergency
procedures.
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5. Predictions were generated for all test maneuvers during phases 1, 2, and
3. The test team used these predictions to monitor trends in AOA and
Mach number. Examples of parameters that were monitored real-time
included sideslip, roll rate, and yaw rate, and errors between estimated
and INS derived AOA and sideslip. Members of the test team used
experiences from simulation practice and engineering judgment to
determine if the next test point should be attempted.

6. All flights were conducted in daylight Visual Meteorological Conditions
(VMC) with a discernable horizon above 5,000 ft. to test altitude with a
clear view of the ground. Additionally, unobstructed visibility to obtain
ground video tracking of the aircraft was required during Phase 2.

7. Lateral weight asymmetry was monitored during flight, with no
maneuvers initiated with asymmetries beyond those identified for each
phase of testing. The longitudinal location of CG was monitored during
the flight to ensure that all maneuvers were performed within the
clearance limits.

8. Standard and consistent terminology was used for test conduct. TM
room to aircraft radio transmissions followed an “ACTION - REASON”
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format. The “action” element will direct the pilot to take an action as
appropriate for the situation, such as terminating maneuvering and
returning the aircraft to straight/level flight (“recover”), reducing power
to IDLE (“throttles IDLE”), or inputting a recovery control (“stick
right”). The “reason” will be added when appropriate to clarify the cause
for the action, such as “sideslip”, “yaw rate”, “loads”, or “engine stall”.
Anticipated KIO calls are presented in appendix B as well.

9. Throttles remained fixed (or brought to IDLE) for all maneuvers except
as specified in the maneuver description, such as asymmetric thrust.
Engine parameters were monitored during all testing. If the propulsion
engineer observed a pop stall that clears without any action by the pilot
(self-recovering pop stall), the maneuver would be allowed to continue.
These are of short duration and may or may not be noticeable to the
aircrew and do not result in any damage. If the aircrew observed a stall,
the throttles would be retarded to IDLE and the maneuver terminated. If
the stall clears, the propulsion engineer will analyze the engine data and
determine if testing may continue. If the stall cannot be attributed to a
known condition, the aircraft will RTB. For hung stalls, defined as stalls
that do not clear after the throttles are moved to IDLE, the affected
engine would be secured and the aircraft returned to base IAW
NATOPS. If temperature transient limits were not exceeded, the pilot
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may re-start the engine prior to landing. If temperature transient limits
were exceeded for any stall event, the pilot would RTB for
precautionary hot section inspection. Engine history and component life
data from the pool of available engines was studied to ensure selection
of healthy engines for the test aircraft. Engines were borescoped prior to
the start of testing to document baseline engine condition. Any
replacement engine will also be borescoped prior to testing.

10. To reduce the possibility of an engine flameout due to fuel starvation,
the feed tanks were verified to be full of fuel before all negative g
maneuvers, with at least one minute with positive load factor between
negative g maneuvers.

11. NATOPS recovery procedures were to be used during both intentional
and unintentional departures. However, if NATOPS recovery procedures
failed to recover the aircraft, alternate recovery procedures were
identified and were briefed prior to each flight. Alternate recovery
procedures are presented in appendix B. Included in the alternate
recovery procedures were the use of asymmetric thrust to recover from
spins and the selection of maximum afterburner during delayed
recoveries from sustained Falling Leaf departures. However, the use of

64

thrust to assist recovery was only to be attempted after sustained
aerodynamic recovery controls have proven ineffective.

12. If a FCS failure occurred or a Master Caution annunciated during a
maneuver, the maneuver was to be aborted. If a FCS failure occurred
during a departure, the flight controls engineer would examine the FCS
display and make an advisory call to the pilot on whether or not a FCS
reset should be attempted.

13. Recovery controls were to be initiated by at least 25,000 ft AGL for
maneuvers started at 35,000 ft AGL and above. If the aircraft departed
controlled flight during any maneuver initiated below 35,000 ft Hp,
recovery controls were to be applied immediately.

14. The pilot will eject if dive recovery is not indicated by 6,000 ft AGL.

15. For the purposes of this test, the aircraft will have departed controlled
flight if the aircraft does not respond to pilot inputs. The following are
examples of departures: the aircraft motion is uncommanded (aircraft
rolls opposite pilot input), the aircraft does not roll in the direction
commanded by the pilot, or the aircraft diverges in yaw.
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FLIGHT TEST PROCEDURES
The maneuvers described below were flown to collect the desired data to satisfy
the objectives of this test plan.
Due to the potential for rapid altitude and energy loss during HI AOA
maneuvering, unless otherwise specified, the allowable altitude band for maneuver entry
for 35,000 ft pressure altitude (Hp) maneuvers was 32,000 to 38,000 ft Hp. For the
25,000 ft Hp maneuvers the allowable altitude band was 22,000 to 28,000 ft Hp. For the
15,000 ft Hp maneuvers the allowable altitude band was 12,000 to 18,000 ft Hp.
Operational maneuvers were performed down to 10,000 ft AGL during the first two
flights for operational maneuvers, and down to 5,000 ft AGL during the last two flights
for operational maneuvers.

F/A-18 A-D DAF Operation
The flight test DAF option in the FCC software allowed predetermined, pre-tested
alterations of selected constants inside the control law software during flight. This option
could be used to optimize parameters (e.g., roll rates) or be used to reduce risk in the
flight control system development by allowing for quick changes to the flight control
software in areas where changes were likely to be needed during flight test.
After selecting the desired option and engaging DAF, the constants contained in
the DAF table and option replace their control law counterparts. Faders are used, as
appropriate, to minimize engage transients. The test pilot evaluates the performance with
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the DAF option and can, if desired, choose another DAF option or baseline (DAF
disengaged) for comparison.
DAF is a special flight test mode that is inhibited in production software releases.
There are several safety interlocks that prevent it from operating in a production box and
it requires several special procedures to enable it for flight test purposes.

INSTRUMENTATION CHECK OUT AND RIG CHECK
Maneuvering Objectives
A single flight was flown with FCC V10.5.1 to verify proper operation of
instrumentation, proper rig of the test aircraft's control surfaces, and that the radome on
the test aircraft was suitable for maneuvers at high AOA. The FCS rig check and HI
AOA radome check were also performed on the single seat aircraft as required. The rig
check tested the roll off with neutral trim at airspeeds of 300, 400, 500, and 550 KCAS.
The radome check determined if radome surface imperfections generated excessive
directional divergence or yaw rate during at high AOA from pure longitudinal stick
inputs. This check used a 1g full aft stick stall an abrupt aft stick pull accelerated stall.
Failure criteria was if yaw rate exceeded 15 deg/sec, sideslip exceeded 10 deg, the
aircraft departed, or the spin mode logic activated during either the 1g or accelerated
stalls.

67

Lateral Stick Rolls
Rolls were performed to baseline the roll performance of the aircraft with OFP
v10.5.1 software as follows:

1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
4. When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll under the bottom.
5. Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec.

Abrupt Pull-Ups
1. Establish the desired test conditions.
2. Select MIL power and abruptly apply full aft stick (within 0.25
seconds), and hold for 2.5 seconds. Monitor load factor and angle of
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attack. If Nz ref or an AOA limit is reached, terminate maneuver by
relaxing aft stick input.
3. Recover to wings level flight.

4.5 – 5.0 g Loop
1. Establish 1 g level flight at 0.8 IMN and 10,000 ft Hp.
2. Select MIL power and smoothly apply aft stick to capture and
maintain desired initial load factor. Decrease load factor following
the "1 percent rule" (load factor 1 percent of calibrated airspeed).
Maintain bank angle using lateral stick inputs and referencing the
horizon.

Break-Turns
1. Establish the desired initial conditions.
2. Smoothly roll to 90 deg angle of bank. Reduce throttles to idle and
abruptly pull to maximum load factor and/or AOA.
3. After maximum AOA is reached, recover.

FLIGHT TEST BUILDUP APPROACH DURING OFP V10.6.1 DEVELOPMENT
The test sequencing during initial OFP v10.6.1 development was divided into four
major phases, with each phase having specific maneuvering objectives and buildup
sequencing:
Phase 1 – Prediction Model and Control Law Algorithm Assessment
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Phase 2 – Out-of-Control Recovery Demonstration
Phase 3 – Departure Resistance/Susceptibility/Recovery; Failures
Phase 4 – Operational Assessment

The test objectives, test loading and test point sequencing, maneuver descriptions,
and KIO criteria for each phase are described below:

PHASE 1 TEST MANEUVERS
Maneuvering Objectives
The objective of Phase 1 was conduct single-axis maneuvers with very low risk of
departure so that the accuracy of the prediction models and control law algorithms could
be assessed. Test points in Phase 1 were selected based on simulations that predict a
clear absence of departure, with knock-it-off criteria also established to avoid a departure.
Any point known to depart with V10.5.1 control laws but predicted fixed in the V10.6.1
control laws were not flown in this phase to further mitigate departure risk.

Test Sequencing
Test sequencing was a buildup of external loadings, maneuvers, and AOA. Mach
number was sequenced from low to high as a buildup, following by a buildup of high
altitude to low altitude. The buildup utilized was specifically as follows:
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Loading Buildup
The aircraft is flown first without a centerline tank, transitioning to flights with a
centerline tank.

Maneuver Buildup
Longitudinal-only maneuvers were conducted first before rolling maneuvers within
each configuration. All longitudinal points at all flight conditions were conducted prior
to rolling maneuvers. The objectives of the longitudinal points were to show adequate
lateral-directional damping of small perturbations, and to also exercise the AOA
Estimator used to compute AOA beyond the probe limit of 35 degrees.
Rolling maneuvers were conducted next, in the order of low-AOA to high AOA at each
flight condition progressing from low Mach to high Mach number at high altitude, then
transitioning to lower altitude. Lateral-only inputs were conducted first, followed by
pedal-only, followed by lateral+pedal. Lateral+Pedal inputs are designed to engage the
new “Pirouette logic” to substantially boost high AOA roll performance and was
considered the highest risk for roll overshoots – but with sideslip excursions predicted to
be well-controlled for all configurations. Roll maneuver test points with the two-place
aircraft configured with a centerline tank were limited to 25 degrees AOA to avoid the
V10.5.1 departure-prone regime near 35 degrees AOA. Roll maneuver test points of 30
degrees and above were conducted on the single-place aircraft with centerline tank – a
more stable configuration – to collect the needed data while mitigating the departure risk.
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Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria
All roll maneuvers were terminated at 360 degrees of roll angle change or 15
seconds duration, whichever came first. Sideslip was monitored with a knock-it-off
criteria of 15 degrees. The FCC lagged yaw rate used to determine a spin condition was
also monitored with a knock-it-off criteria of 15 degrees – 2 degrees less than the 17degree threshold used for the spin condition indication. This knock-it-off criterion was
used to guard against immediate spin mode entry during a normal roll maneuver if a spin
arrow should inadvertently be presented. Note that the spin arrow presentation is both a
condition of lagged yaw rate greater than 17 degrees, and also indicated compressible
dynamic pressure (qc) less than 50 psf. Since indicated dynamic pressure can read
erroneously low at high AOA, the qc<50 condition was assumed to always exist.

Test Maneuvers
Longitudinal Maneuvers--1g Stalls
1. Establish 1-g level flight 5,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Reduce power to IDLE and allow AOA to increase.
3. Sample handling qualities every 5 deg AOA by performing pitch,
lateral, and rudder doublets.
4. Gradually apply aft stick to increase AOA
5. Apply lateral stick and rudder pedal inputs as required to offset
any roll-off tendencies.
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6. At full aft stick, hold for 5 sec and sample handling qualities in
each axis.
Terminate maneuver by releasing controls.

Success Criteria: Maneuver conducted within 5,000 ft of target altitude.

Wind-Down/Break Turns
Wind-down turns (WDTs) were used to evaluate the accuracy of the AOA
estimator when AOA is greater than 35 deg:
1. Establish the specified initial conditions.
2. Smoothly roll into an overbanked turn, applying aft stick at a target
rate of 1 inch/sec. Selected test points will be repeated as a break
turn, with an abrupt full aft stick input (full input within 0.25 sec).
3. Maintain full aft stick until airspeed reaches 80 KCAS.
4. Terminate maneuver by releasing controls.

Success Criteria:
• Full aft stick is attained within ± 0.05 Mach of target Mach.

Lateral Maneuvers Lateral Stick Rolls:
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
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3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
4. When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll over the top, or under the
bottom (as required).
5. Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec.

Sustained Pedal Rolls
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
4. Maintain longitudinal and lateral stick (±1/2 in.) and apply abrupt
pedal.
5. Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
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• Longitudinal and lateral stick maintained within ± 1/2 in. of neutral
during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full pedal input within 0.3 sec.

Combined Lateral Stick plus Pedal Rolls
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
4. When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2
in.) and apply abrupt simultaneous lateral stick and pedal to roll over
the top or under the bottom.
5. Remove control inputs after 360 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in. of neutral during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full control inputs within 0.3 sec.
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PHASE 2 TEST MANEUVERS
Maneuvering Objectives
The objective of this phase was to verify recovery from post-departure gyrations
(PDGs) and sustained OCF modes. Recovery from OCF modes was evaluated during
Phase 2 to reduce the risk and minimize the consequences of entering OCF modes during
Phase 3. Departure recoveries from PDGs resulting from tailslides and vertical
recoveries, upright spins, and falling leafs were evaluated. Inverted spins were not
planned since the control law update has not affected negative AOA, and no large
negative AOA points were planned. Only NATOPS recovery techniques were evaluated,
however, alternate recovery techniques were available if NATOPS recovery techniques
fail to recover the aircraft.
Test Sequencing
Test points were conducted on the most stable external loading first (FE),
progressing to less stable with a centerline tank. Full-up control laws were flown first,
followed by a simulated failure of the INS attitudes (INS-OFF mode). The final Phase 2
testing was conducted with a 6K ft-lb lateral weight asymmetry since lateral weight
asymmetries have historically resulted in the longest recovery times.

Loading Buildup
Two-place Fighter Escort was flown first, followed by the two-place FCL loading,
followed by INS-OFF testing in the two-place FCL loading, followed by the two-place
6K asymmetry loading. The first three loadings were flown consecutively in preparation
76

for the Phase 3 testing with similar loadings. Recovery in INS-OFF mode was
demonstrated in this phase in case the mode is unexpectedly entered during follow-on
testing. The Phase 2 testing with the 6K asymmetry loading was flown later in the
program, but prior to the majority of the test points in that configuration. Out-of-control
recovery points in the INS-OFF mode and in the 6K asymmetry loading were preceded
with longitudinal maneuvers, which were not predicted to depart controlled flight.

Maneuver Buildup
Spins were conducted first, in the order of increasing maximum yaw rate target
buildup. A half turn incipient spin was conducted in loading FE and 6KASYM prior to
the fully developed spins for buildup and to evaluate NATOPS recovery techniques.
Spins were conducted stepping up at 30, 60, and 90 degrees/second. Three spins were
conducted at each target yaw rate before moving up to the next rate.
Vertical recoveries and tailslides were conducted next. Tailslides were also be
performed with the nose of the aircraft biased just prior to and just beyond the vertical,
and then with the nose of the aircraft biased left and right of vertical. Low-speed banked
flight has been shown to be a common way that falling leaf motion has been entered in
fleet events, giving the tailslide with the nose biased either left or right of vertical the best
chance of entering falling leaf motion.
Intentional falling leaf entry maneuvers using MSRM for entry were conducted last,
being historically the motion requiring most altitude for recovery. Because the v10.6.1
control laws were designed to damp this motion, sustained falling leaf motion was not
possible once MSRM was disabled.
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Real Time Trend Analysis
Spins were evaluated in a yaw rate buildup of 30, 60, and 90 deg/sec. The Test
Team evaluated each recovery and determined if the recovery met expectations. The
next highest yaw rate point would then be attempted only if the test team felt that the
recovery would be adequate based on the trends of the buildups and predictions. Time for
yaw rate to decay, number of turns before recovery, and altitude lost during recovery
were used as metrics to measure the recovery performance.
Falling leaf motion should be damped promptly after MSRM is disabled. The test
team evaluated each recovery and would have recommended that further entry attempts
not be made if the recovery was prolonged and not as predicted (i.e. any prolonged
departure that descends below 20,000 ft Hp).

Test Maneuvers
Descriptions of OCF mode entry and recovery techniques are given in the
following sections.

Spins
All spin entries were made using asymmetric thrust. MSRM was used if target
yaw rate could not be attained using asymmetric thrust. Maximum target yaw rate was 90
deg/sec. A single half turn incipient spin was performed in loadings FE and 6KASYM.
Buildup spins were flown using target yaw rates of 30 and 60 deg/sec, both to the left and
right. Recovery was made by moving the throttles to IDLE, deactivating MSRM (if
used), and applying NATOPS recovery controls.
78

Asymmetric Thrust Upright Spin Procedures
1. Stabilize at wings level, 150 KCAS and 35,000 ft Hp.
2. Slowly reduce both throttles to IDLE, set 20 to 25 deg pitch attitude, and
hold.
3. At 35 deg AOA, smoothly apply full aft stick.
4. Smoothly increase thrust on left/right engine to MIL with the other engine at
IDLE until target yaw rate is achieved. Apply full pro-spin rudder pedal
input, relax aft stick, and pro-spin lateral stick as required.
5. To recover, bring both throttles to IDLE, remove rudder pedal input, relax full
aft stick and apply NATOPS recovery controls.

MSRM Upright Spin
Stabilize at wings level, 150 KCAS and 35,000 ft Hp.
Select spin recovery switch to RCVY and reduce power to IDLE.
Establish downward flight path angle of approximately 20 degrees.
Smoothly apply full aft stick.
After spin mode engages, smoothly apply full rudder pedal.
Smoothly increase thrust on engine opposite of rudder pedal input to MIL
with other engine at IDLE until target yaw rate is achieved.
Slowly apply lateral stick opposite rudder pedal input while coming off the
aft stop.
At the target yaw rate, neutralize controls and bring both throttles to IDLE.
Select spin recovery switch to NORM and apply NATOPS recovery controls.
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Tailslides / 100 KCAS Vertical Recoveries
Tailslide maneuvers were performed to evaluate departure resistance:
Start at 30,000 ft Hp / 300-350 KCAS.
In MIL power, pull to an upward, near vertical attitude.
When the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs, reduce power to
IDLE, release the controls and allow the aircraft to recover.

Variations to this maneuver included:
1. Biasing the nose attitude of the aircraft in the following ways: nose
forward, nose back, nose left, and nose right.
2. At 100 KCAS, apply full forward or full aft stick, releasing controls and
reducing power to IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control
inputs.
3. At 100 KCAS, apply full forward or full aft stick, reducing power to
IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs, and
releasing controls when sustained oscillations develop or when the
aircraft descends through 30,000 ft Hp.
4. At 180 KCAS, apply full lateral then either full forward or aft stick after
maximum roll rate is reached, releasing controls and reducing power to
IDLE when the aircraft no longer responds to control inputs.
5. At 180 KCAS, apply full lateral then either full forward or aft stick after
maximum roll rate is reached, reducing power to IDLE when the aircraft
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no longer responds to control inputs, and releasing controls when
sustained oscillations develop or when the aircraft descends through
30,000 ft Hp.

Falling Leaf Test Points
Not all falling leaf entry attempts were successful. For the purpose of this test, a
sustained falling leaf was defined as at least two cycles of in-phase rolling and yawing
motion.

MSRM Falling Leaf Entry:
1. Stabilize at wings level, 0.5 IMN /40K (145 KCAS).
2. Select spin recovery switch to RCVY to enter MSRM and reduce power to
IDLE.
3. Establish dive angle of approximately 20 degrees.
4. Smoothly apply full aft stick and hold.
5. Apply lateral stick to generate sideslip (some side-to-side cycling may be
necessary to generate largest sideslip).
6. Neutralize controls. Falling leaf motion is characterized by large sustained
oscillatory yaw rate motion with approximate 5 second period. Allow motion
to persist for two cycles or until 25,000 feet altitude.
7. Recover by selecting spin recovery switch to NORM and neutralizing
controls. Falling leaf motion should be damped promptly after CAS is
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enabled due to the sideslip rate feedback and other control law features
incorporated in the upgraded flight control system.

PHASE 3 TESTING
Maneuvering Objectives
The objectives of Phase 3 were to evaluate departure resistance and to evaluate
recovery from departure.

Test Sequencing
Test sequencing in Phase 3 was in the order of test points least likely to depart with
single-axis input to intentional departures with multi-axis inputs, and then to failure
modes. Configurations were flown in the order of most-stable symmetric to least-stable
symmetric, then to asymmetric loadings – smallest asymmetry to largest asymmetry, then
to a symmetric loading with an aft CG.

Loading Buildup
The external loadings were sequenced generally from most-stable to least-stable for
the series of single-axis long-duration inputs, including those points that were predicted
to depart in the V10.5.1 control laws. Loading sequencing were two-place FCL (high
AOA points), single-place FCL (low AOA points), Interdiction, Two-Tank, 6K
asymmetry, 12K asymmetry, and aft CG Fighter Escort. Once those points were
completed, the loading shifted back to a more stable loading of the two-place FCL to
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perform the multi-axis aggravated inputs, followed by multi-axis inputs repeated in the
6K asymmetry loading. Simulated FCS failures were tested last in the two-place FCL
loading.

Maneuver Buildup
AOA/Mach number/Altitude buildup for the long-duration single-axis maneuvers
were similar to Phase 1. Roll maneuvering buildup was also be similar to Phase 1,
starting with lateral-only, progressing to pedal-only, progressing to lateral+pedal. For test
points for which sideslips were predicted to be greater than 15º or yaw rates were
predicted to be greater than 40º/sec, the onsite test team added half input or 180º or 360º
buildup test points. Operational assessment of the pirouette maneuver was conducted
after the long-duration lateral+pedal maneuvers were conducted. An extra assessment of
inadvertently engaging the Automatic Spin Recovery Mode was conducted upon
evaluating the results of the long-duration single-axis control inputs.
The order of the aggravated multi-axis inputs was in the order of those maneuvers
that were predicted to remain controlled, to maneuvers that were predicted to depart.
Since Phase 2 testing had already demonstrated OCF recovery, the risk of departure
had been mitigated whether the Phase 3 maneuvers departed or not. The assumption was
that all Phase 3 maneuvers will depart and that the recovery risk had been mitigated.
For the failure modes, INS-OFF was conducted first, followed by other redundancy
management failure modes. Failure mode sequencing was not vital, since no testing
depends on the other.
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Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria
Maneuvers were terminated at 720 degrees of roll angle change or 15 seconds,
whichever came first, while under controlled flight
Test Maneuvers - The maneuvers for this phase are summarized below
Longitudinal Maneuvers
1g Stalls - See maneuver descriptions for Phase 1.

Wind-Down Turns - See maneuver descriptions for Phase 1.

Lateral Maneuvers - Rolls were performed in alternating directions. Rolls in the
asymmetric loadings were performed in both directions, and rolls were
performed in the non-critical direction first (based on simulation predictions).
The exception to this was rolls selected for regression testing, which were
performed in the most critical direction based on simulation predictions,

Lateral Stick Rolls
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
4. When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2
in.) and apply abrupt lateral stick to roll over the top, or under the
bottom (as required).
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5. Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full lateral stick input within 0.3 sec.

Sustained Pedal Rolls For conditions above 1 g Nz.
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
For conditions at or less than 1 g Nz.
1. Establish 1-g level flight 1,000 ft below specified altitude. Select
wing fuel transfer to INHIBIT.
2. Establish a pitch attitude with the nose of the aircraft above the
horizon.
3. Apply forward stick to capture specified AOA and attempt to hold
flight condition by applying power as required.

When established on conditions:
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4. Maintain longitudinal and lateral stick (±1/2 in.) and apply abrupt
pedal.
5. Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds. Select wing fuel transfer to NORM (as required).
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal and lateral stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full pedal input in within 0.3 sec.

In addition to the general KIO criteria for Phase 3, the plan terminated the
maneuver once any of the following criteria were exceeded:

- 30 seconds at negative Nz.
- Engine oil pressure caution.
- Fuel boost pressure low caution.

Combined Lateral Stick plus Pedal Rolls
1. Establish 1-g level flight 2,000 ft above specified altitude.
2. Establish bank angle as required.
3. Pull to specified AOA and attempt to hold flight condition by
applying power or diving as required.
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4. When stabilized at the target AOA, maintain longitudinal stick (±1/2
in.) and apply abrupt simultaneous lateral stick and pedal to roll over
the top or under the bottom.
5. Remove control inputs after 720 degree roll angle change or after 15
seconds.
Success Criteria:
• Longitudinal stick maintained within ± 1/2 in during roll.
• Roll conducted at altitude within 2,000 ft of target altitude.
• Full control inputs within 0.3 sec.

Pirouettes
Establish 1-g flight at the specified initial conditions.
Coordinate a pull to approximately 30 to 40 degrees AOA with a pitch
attitude of approximately 50 to 90 degrees nose high.
Holding aft stick to maintain AOA, insert a combined lateral stick and
pedal input to perform a nose-high to nose-low heading reversal.
Continuing to hold aft stick to maintain AOA, apply aggressive
opposite lateral stick and pedal to capture the target heading.

Aggravated Control Inputs - The set-ups to these maneuvers were identical to a
lateral stick roll. Instead of applying lateral stick, however, one of the following
inputs as specified was applied:
- Simultaneous lateral and aft input (to aft corner).
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- Simultaneous lateral and forward input (to forward corner).
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in same direction with aft stick input.
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in same direction with forward stick
input.
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal inputs in opposite direction.
- Simultaneous lateral and pedal input in opposite direction with aft stick
input.
-

Full lateral stick to achieve maximum roll rate at the test flight
condition. At maximum roll rate, apply full aft stick for the
remainder of the maneuver.

Flat and Rolling Scissors
As buildup for the operational maneuvers in Phase 4, flat and rolling scissors were
performed to evaluate the performance of the AOA estimator during prolonged
maneuvers above 35 deg AOA.

Failure Modes
The following failure modes were evaluated during phase 3: True airspeed or
MUX bus invalid, INS attitude angles invalid, AOA probe failures and stuck AOA
probes. The following paragraphs describe how each of these failures were
simulated.
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True Airspeed or MUX Bus invalid True Airspeed
True airspeed is used by the upgraded control laws in the calculation to estimate
AOA when the mechanical AOA probes are pegged. The software includes a
calculation to estimate true airspeed when either the Mission Computer declares
true airspeed invalid, or in the event of a MUX Bus failure. For this test program, a
DAF option was used that forced the FCCs into using estimated true airspeed.
INS Attitude Angles
INS roll and pitch attitude angles are used in the AOA and sideslip estimation
logic. In the event that the INS attitudes become invalid, the AOA and sideslip
estimators are designed to degrade to a backup mode. In the production aircraft,
selecting the attitude selector switch to STBY on the on the HUD results in the
INS attitudes being declared invalid. With v10.6.1 and v10.7, this forces the FCC
to ignore the INS attitudes and degrade the AOA and sideslip estimators to their
respective backup modes.

AOA Probe Failures
Changes that are designed to improve the handling of stuck AOA probes or total
failures of the AOA probe were included in v10.6.1 and v10.7. To evaluate these
improvements, DAF was used to simulate a single stuck AOA probe or a total
AOA failure. Testing was performed with the left AOA probe simulated stuck at
0.1 degrees and with a simulated total AOA probe failure.
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PHASE 4 TESTING
Maneuvering Objectives
The objectives of Phase 4 were to evaluate departure resistance and evaluate flying
qualities during operational maneuvers. All flights were flown with adherence to the
Navy standard air combat maneuvering (ACM) training rules. The FCLP loading of
centerline fuel tank and empty wing pylons was flown in this phase.
Test Sequencing
Test sequencing consideration was only in terms of single-place/two-place test
order. The successful completion of the first three phases allowed full aircraft usage
under NATOPS limitations, except removal of the subsonic two-place placard regarding
AOA and Mach number restrictions.

Loading Buildup
Even though the single-place was the more stable of the two configurations, the
two-place aircraft was flown first since it contained more detailed instrumentation.

Maneuver Entry and KIO Criteria
Maneuvers were constrained under NATOPS limitations, except as modified or
expanded based on Phase 3 testing. The hard deck (minimum altitude for ACM) was
10,000 ft Hp for the first two flights, and 5,000 ft Hp for all subsequent flights.
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Test Maneuvers
Test maneuvers included Air-to-Air Target Gross Acquisition and Fine Tracking at
High AOA, flat and rolling scissors, pirouettes. Additionally, other operationally
representative ACM drills and engagements were conducted including offensive and
defensive maneuvering, snapshot drills, guns defense, butterfly sets and abeam sets.
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APPENDIX B: OUT OF CONTROL EMERGENCY RECOVERY
PROCEDURES

(NOTE: NATOPS procedures appear in normal font, alternate recovery procedures
appear in italics. From David, 2003)

RECOVERY INDICATIONS AND PROCEDURES

Recovery is indicated when AOA and yaw rate tone is removed, side forces subside, and
airspeed is increasing above 180 KCAS.
One g roll to nearest horizon
Throttles – MAX (MIL if altitude not critical)
Pull to and maintain 25 to 35 deg AOA until positive rate of climb established (AOA
configuration dependent). With LEF failures do not exceed 10 deg AOA.

DEPARTURE/FALLING LEAF RECOVERY PROCEDURES

Controls – release / feet off rudders / speedbrake in
If still out of control – Throttles – Idle
Altitude, AOA, airspeed, and yaw rate – Check
When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided,
and airspeed accelerating above 180 knots - Recover
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated - Eject

SUSTAINED OSCILLATORY MOTION RECOVERY PROCEDURES

If INS angle errors are suspected (HUD or RTPS call) - Attitude Selector Switch –
STBY.
If recovery not indicated below 20,000 ft Hp and 12,000 ft of altitude lost – Apply full
aft stick
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If recovery not indicated below 15,000 ft Hp – FCS -- Reset
If recovery not indicated below 10,000 ft Hp - Throttles – MAX A/B
If still no sign of recovery and below 10,000 ft AGL - FCS Gain Override Switch –
ORIDE
When recovery indicated by AOA and yaw rate tones removed, side forces subsided,
and airspeed accelerating above 180 knots – Check FCS Gain Override Switch
NORM and Recover
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated - Eject

SPIN RECOVERY PROCEDURES

Command arrow present - Lateral stick – full with arrow
Command arrow not present – Spin recovery switch – RCVY
Lateral stick – Full with arrow
When yaw rate stops – Lateral stick – Smoothly Neutral
Spin recovery switch – Check NORM
When recovery indicated – Recover
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated – Eject

SUSTAINED SPIN RECOVERY PROCEDURES

If INS angle errors are suspected (HUD OR RTPS call) Attitude Selector Switch –
STBY.
Yaw rate not arresting with full lateral stick
Spin recovery switch – RCVY
Lateral stick – Full with arrow
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If spin shows no sign of recovery:
Right yaw rate – Right engine MAX A/B
Left yaw rate – Left engine MAX A/B
WHEN YAW RATE STOPS
Engines - Idle
Lateral stick – Smoothly neutral
Spin recovery switch – Check NORM
When recovery indicated
Recover
Passing 6,000 ft AGL, dive recovery not initiated Eject
Dual Engine Flameout or Single with Imminent Dual Engine Flameout due to
Fuel Starvation During Departures:
Recover to controlled flight
Accelerate to 350-375 KCAS approximately 50-60 deg nose-down.
Decrease and maintain pitch to not exceed 20 deg nose-down
Maintain RPM >/= 12% (accelerate if necessary to maintain).
Monitor fuel flow indicators for fuel flow (may take ~60 sec.)
Initiate relight procedures per NATOPS once fuel flow is indicated.
If windmill relight is unsuccessful or fuel flow does not respond by 10,000 ft, push to
20 deg nose-down, gently pull approximately 2g to increase fuel pressure head, then
reset to 20 deg nose-down.
Below 10,000 ft Hp, decelerate below 250 KCAS, start APU and attempt to crank
either engine. If propulsion engineers suspect either engine has been damaged, they
will advise pilot which engine should be started.
Passing 2,000 ft AGL with no indications of relight, EJECT.
Note: All procedures for dual engine flameout are immediate action items. Single engine
flameout without BOOST LO warning is likely NOT fuel deprivation related. In this
case, normal NATOPS flameout emergency procedures should be followed.
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HIGH AOA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE BRIEFING GUIDE
EMERGENCY
SITUATION

CONTROL
ROOM CALL

PRIMARY
MONITOR/COMMUNICATOR

AERO/FQ
Unexpected Departure

“Recover – Sideslip (Yaw Rate)”
“Controls – Release”
“Speedbrake – In”
“Throttles – IDLE”

Sustained Out-Of-Control
Suspect INS angles
(AOA or sideslip errors)
or Channel 2 or 4 fail
Oscillatory Yaw Rate (FL):
Alt < 20,000 ft Hp and 12,000 ft lost
Alt < 10,000 ft Hp
(with no engine anomalies)
No Recovery

PROPULSION
Engine Stall/Stagnation
/Flameout
Unrecoverable Stall/Stag
/Flameout Or Overtemp

“Attitude – Standby”

FQ/TC
FC/TC

“Cleared for full aft stick”

FQ/TC

“Throttles – MAX”

FQ/TC

“25,000”, “20,000”, “15,000”, “10,000”
(advisory altitude calls)
“6,000 – Eject, Eject, Eject”

TC/TC

“Recover – Throttles IDLE – (Reason)”

Prop/TC

“(Left/Right) Throttle – Off – (Reason)”

Prop/TC

Engine Restart
“(Left/Right) Throttle – IDLE”
(Aircraft recovered within airstart envelope)
Dual Engine Flameout
(and below 10,000 ft Hp
and < 250 KCAS)
Below 2,000 ft AGL

FQ/FQ
TC/TC
TC/TC
TC/TC

TC/TC

Prop/TC

“Start APU”
“Crank (Left/Right)”

TC/TC
TC/TC

“2,000 – Eject, Eject, Eject”

TC/TC

OTHER
FCS “X” Out During Departure/OOC
and no HYD 1B caution with Left
LEF failure or HYD 2A caution with
Right LEF failure
“Flight Controls – Reset”
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FC/TC

APPENDIX C: SAFETY OF TEST MEASURAND LIST
(Excerpt from David, 2003)
Parameter Description
Pressure Altitude
Airspeed
Fuel Weight
Lateral Asymmetry
Percent CG
Corrected AOA
FCC Estimated AOA
AOSS
FCC Estimated AOSS
Pitch Attitude
Roll Attitude
Pitch Rate
Roll Rate
Yaw Rate
Lagged Yaw Rate
Nz
Longitudinal Stick Position
Lateral Stick Position
Rudder Pedal Force
Spin Mode Engaged
Beta * Q
SQRT(P2+R2)
FCS Status Display
L/R Power Lever Angle
L/R N2
L/R Engine T5
L/R Engine PS3

RTPS Monitor
TC
TC
TC
TC
TC
FQ1
FQ1
FQ1
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FQ1/FQ2
FC
Prop
Prop
Prop
Prop

Notes:
TC = Test Conductor
FQ1/2 = Flying Qualities Engineers
Prop = Propulsion Engineer
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new F/A-18F Super Hornet.
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LCDR Mitchell returned to Patuxent River as a developmental test pilot and
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testing and fleet introduction of FCC 10.7 OFP software.
LCDR Mitchell is currently the Ordnance Support Team Leader for the Atlantic
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